On July 24, 2026, a press conference held by the State Council Information Office revealed that the International Alliance to Combat Telecom and Online Fraud — whose establishment was initiated and prepared by China — will be formally launched this September during the 2026 General Assembly of the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang). As of now, more than 40 countries have expressed their willingness to take part in building it.

📋 Core Assessment

Telecom fraud has evolved from isolated transnational crime into an "industrial-grade" global scourge. China's upgrade — from bilateral law-enforcement cooperation to a multilateral, institutionalized alliance — rests on the credibility accumulated through a series of successful transnational operations over the past three years: from clearing out the four major crime families of the Kokang region in northern Myanmar (with 59,000 people apprehended), to the joint China–Myanmar–Thailand dismantling of the KK Park in Myawaddy (630 buildings demolished), to the first joint China–US–UAE operation, which raided nine dens and arrested 276 people. The participation of 40 countries is not diplomatic posturing; it is the result of combat-tested validation.

A Global Scourge

Telecom and online fraud has become one of the world's leading categories of transnational crime. Fraud dens are highly concentrated overseas, exploiting internet infrastructure and digital payment systems to carry out cross-border money laundering, with victims spread across every continent.

China's Ministry of Public Security noted at the press conference that "the vast majority of fraud dens are currently concentrated overseas" — a characteristic that makes it difficult for traditional law-enforcement systems, built around national borders, to respond effectively. Bilateral law-enforcement cooperation with more than 30 countries — including Spain, the UAE, and Myanmar — has yielded results, but its limitations are obvious: every operation requires re-coordinating legal frameworks, judicial assistance, and enforcement jurisdiction from scratch.

From the standpoint of institutional organization, there were two paths to choose from: one, to expand the mandate of the existing International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol); or two, to establish an intergovernmental organization dedicated specifically to telecom-fraud crime. China chose the latter.

The Alliance's Institutional Design

The alliance is positioned as an "intergovernmental international organization," which sets it fundamentally apart from ordinary law-enforcement coordination mechanisms: it possesses a clear legal personality and operational coordinating capacity, rather than being merely a dialogue platform.

Three core characteristics distinguish it from traditional transnational police cooperation:

The principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. The alliance was initiated by China, but China does not dominate its agenda. The 40-plus countries that have signaled their participation come from different regions and stages of development, which means that rule-making will be a consultative process.

The institutionalization of intelligence-sharing and joint crackdowns. Moving from the past model of "case-by-case coordination" to "normalized intelligence exchange," the alliance will take on institutionalized functions such as intelligence aggregation, the routing of leads, and the coordination of joint operations.

A preventive dimension of joint governance. The alliance will not only handle fraud cases that have already occurred but also engage in source-level governance in areas such as telecommunications networks, financial services, and data flows. This dimension touches on supply-chain governance for telecom-fraud crime.

Trust Built on Combat-Tested Results

The establishment of the alliance is no diplomatic fantasy. Judging from past law-enforcement achievements, China's cooperation with multiple countries in this field has already accumulated a quantifiable "reserve of public credibility":

  • Since 2023, China and Myanmar have jointly cleared out large-scale telecom-fraud parks in northern Myanmar, handing over more than 59,000 criminal suspects and completely dismantling the "four major crime families" syndicates
  • In early 2025, after China, Myanmar, and Thailand established a joint-crackdown mechanism, ten consecutive joint repatriation operations were carried out, and all 630-plus buildings in the KK Park in Myawaddy were demolished
  • In 2026, police from China, the US, and the UAE conducted their first joint operation, raiding nine dens and arresting 276 people
  • Through cooperation with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and others, more than 20,000 fraud-related suspects have been apprehended and repatriated

The significance of these figures lies in the fact that they are not statements or promises, but operational records that have already been completed. When China invites other countries to join the alliance, it can present practical results rather than abstract principles.

The 45-Country Model: A New Path for China's Provision of Global Public Goods

Another noteworthy aspect of the alliance is its organizational form — it was born within the framework of the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang), rather than within the traditional United Nations or Interpol system. This choice of path reflects China's preference in participating in global security governance: starting with functional cooperation, accumulating trust through verifiable results, and then progressively institutionalizing.

The Ministry of Public Security also revealed a key detail at the press conference: since October 2025, the number of telecom-fraud cases filed in China has declined year on year for nine consecutive months. This indicates that domestic telecom-fraud governance has already formed a reusable set of experiences and tools — including anti-fraud early-warning systems, fund-interception mechanisms, and cross-border investigative-assistance procedures. Sharing these tools and experiences with the alliance's member states will be one of the core values of the alliance after its establishment.

📝 By the Numbers

59,000 (apprehended through China–Myanmar cooperation) + 20,000 (through cooperation with multiple Southeast Asian countries) + 276 (through China–US–UAE cooperation) = nearly 80,000 fraud-related personnel processed according to law. Behind these numbers lies an accumulation of credibility — a journey from bilateral investigative assistance to a multilateral, institutionalized alliance — with each step leaving behind an empirical record open to verification.

The alliance is expected to be formally established in September 2026 during the 2026 General Assembly of the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang), at which point its charter, the establishment of its secretariat, and its first batch of action plans will be announced.