In July 2026, Trump's tariff policy entered a new phase: after the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs, the White House is reconstructing a global tariff regime through Section 122 and Section 301. At the same time, data from the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Dallas have begun to systematically expose a mechanism that had previously been overlooked — the shock of a tariff is not a one-time price adjustment but a "trickle-down effect," one that seeps slowly yet persistently into the everyday spending of American consumers through corporate pricing strategy.
This mechanism deserves analysis on its own terms, because it explains a central paradox of Trump's tariffs: why, more than a year after implementation, inflationary pressure is still building rather than being "priced in once" and then returning to normal.
The Mechanism of the Trickle-Down — A Contest Between Two Pricing Strategies
In a recent post, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York pointed directly to the source of tariff inflation's persistence: "Although economists and policymakers typically expect tariff-driven price increases to constitute a one-time adjustment in the price level, in practice the so-called 'one-off' can evolve into a protracted process, particularly when tariffs are changing frequently."
The key to this sentence lies in its second half — "tariffs are changing frequently." When firms cannot anticipate whether tariff rates will rise further in the future, their pricing behavior stops being a "one-and-done" move and becomes more strategic.
The New York Fed's research finds that firms' response strategies fall broadly into two categories:
Constrained by fixed contracts. Some firms are bound by sales contracts and cannot raise retail prices before those contracts expire. During the contract period they can only absorb the tariff cost themselves, passing it through after expiry. For these firms, price adjustment is "deferred" rather than "cancelled" — inflationary pressure is compressed into a time pipeline and released over the months that follow.
Boiling the frog in warm water. More firms opt for "gradual" price increases — rather than passing the full tariff cost through in one go, they raise prices in stages and by small increments. This approach has two advantages: first, it avoids the consumer backlash that a "price shock" would trigger; second, it preserves flexibility — if tariff rates rise further, the firm can accelerate its price increases rather than having already "fired all its ammunition."
The seasoning brand McCormick & Company is a textbook case of the latter strategy. On an earnings call, CEO Brendan Foley described the company's two rounds of price hikes (last September and this February) as "precision pricing," which, together with US$31 million in tariff refunds, helped the company expand its gross margin last quarter. The "precision" here corresponds not to "fair" or "reasonable" but to "shifting the cost cleanly before consumers have a chance to react."
Letting the Data Speak — Measurable Transmission from Firms to Households
A May study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas provides a quantitative estimate of tariff inflation. The research finds that US core inflation reached 3.2 percent in March 2026, the highest level in three years, with a surge in tariff costs as the primary driver. Economists' modeling suggests that, absent these tariffs, inflation over the same period would have been about 0.80 percentage points lower, holding around 2.3 percent.
This means tariffs contributed roughly one quarter of US inflation in the first quarter of 2026. It is not a small disturbance — it is structural pressurization.
Projections from the Tax Foundation convert the tariff burden into a per-household figure: in 2026, tariffs will impose an average additional cost of US$700 on American households, on top of the US$1,000 already incurred in 2025 — over two years, a typical American family will have paid a cumulative US$1,700 more because of tariffs.
But the transmission's time lag deserves even more attention. An independent Federal Reserve study in April found that consumers feel the pressure of tariffs with a lag of up to seven months: "If a retailer's cost of acquiring a good rises by one dollar because of a tariff, they will raise the price of that good by one dollar seven months later." This means the inflationary effect of tariffs imposed in the first half of 2026 will not fully release until late 2026 or even early 2027.
The actual bearer of the tariff cost is equally worth scrutinizing. Federal Reserve data show that, despite Trump's repeated claims that exporters would absorb the added cost, importers — that is, American businesses and consumers — bear close to 90 percent of the tariff burden. This figure punctures the core of the "tariffs are paid by foreigners" narrative.
The Federal Reserve's empirical study of tariff transmission timing — a full seven-month chain from procurement cost to retail price — means that any argument resting on "current inflation has come down, therefore tariffs have no effect" ignores the transmission lag.
Policy Context — Rebuilding the Tariff Puzzle After the IEEPA Collapse
Analysis of this round of tariff inflation cannot be separated from a critical legal backdrop: in 2026 the Supreme Court, in a 6–3 ruling, struck down the tariffs Trump had imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The ruling stripped the legal basis from US$166 billion in tariff revenue, and the White House immediately set about reconstructing a legal alternative.
Two substitute tools have emerged. The first is a temporary tariff based on Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — a little-used provision that has never truly been activated, and whose legal applicability remains contested. The second is a Section 301 tariff targeting countries found to engage in "unreasonable or discriminatory trade practices." On July 7, the Office of the United States Trade Representative opened a three-day hearing to determine whether the 60 countries investigated in March had failed to prevent the export of goods made with forced labor.
These legal alternatives form the policy context of the tariff trickle-down effect: tariffs do not disappear because of a Supreme Court ruling — they simply continue to exist under a different legal face. Persistent uncertainty — not knowing today what tomorrow's tariff rate will be — is precisely the core driver behind firms choosing a "boiling the frog in warm water" pricing strategy.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York: when tariffs are changing frequently, the so-called "one-time adjustment" can, in practice, evolve into a protracted process.
The Contested Nature of the Trickle-Down Tariff
The Trump administration packages this tariff strategy as an economic framework — using tariffs to force more manufacturing back to the United States, with the short-term pass-through of costs framed as the "necessary price of the transition." But the empirical data from the New York and Dallas Fed challenge this framework.
On one hand, the reshoring logic requires firms to rebuild production capacity on US soil, which takes years and enormous capital investment. Before reshoring is actually completed, the sole bearers of the tariff cost are American consumers and importers. On the other hand, the "trickle-down" character of the tariff — the fact that costs are passed downstream in stages and with a lag — means firms can recover the tariff cost through pricing strategy alone, without rebuilding capacity. This, in turn, weakens the mechanism by which tariffs are supposed to force reshoring.
The trickle-down effect of Trump's tariffs reveals a structural paradox: tariffs are designed to force manufacturing to reshore by raising the cost of imports, yet firms' rational response — phased price increases and gradual release of inflationary pressure — turns the tariff into a cost that can be "absorbed" rather than a penalty that is "unbearable." The smoother the trickle-down, the weaker the industrial-policy effect of the tariff. In a world where firms have learned "boiling the frog in warm water" pricing, the tariff's industrial-guidance function and its fiscal-revenue function are diverging: the former growing ever weaker, the latter ever stronger.