At 12:01 p.m. on July 6, 2026, a strategic nuclear submarine of the People's Liberation Army Navy successfully launched a submarine-launched strategic missile carrying a training simulation warhead into the relevant high seas of the Pacific Ocean, and it accurately hit the pre-designated waters. This high-visibility capability demonstration came less than two years after the September 2024 Rocket Force ICBM full-range test — and together, they closed the loop on China's strategic nuclear deterrent in both the land- and sea-based dimensions.
This test completes the operational verification of China's strategic nuclear deterrent on the two dimensions of "land-based + sea-based." The successful test of the land-based mobile ICBM and the submarine-launched strategic missile together construct a credible picture of second-strike capability.
The Key Piece of the Triad
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are the most survivable element of a great power's nuclear triad. Compared with land-based ICBMs and strategic bombers, the stealth of strategic nuclear submarines makes them carry the core mission of "second strike" — ensuring that after an opponent's first strike, an effective strategic retaliation capability is still preserved.
Military commentator Shen Yi offered a systematic deconstruction: a stable, effective, and credible second-strike capability is the key to maintaining strategic stability among great powers. The signal delivered by this test to the outside world is — China not only has land-based mobile capability, it also has credible submarine-launched strategic retaliation capability; together these constitute the deterrent floor on which "rivals dare not gamble."
September 25, 2024: The Rocket Force launched an ICBM into the relevant high seas of the Pacific Ocean (retrospectively disclosed by CCTV on June 21, 2026)
12:01 p.m. on July 6, 2026: A Navy strategic nuclear submarine successfully launched a submarine-launched strategic missile into the relevant high seas of the Pacific Ocean
Both launches used training simulation warheads, both provided advance notification to the relevant countries, and both were characterized as "routine arrangements for annual military training."
A Composite Signal Aimed at Multiple Audiences
This test was not a single-dimensional display of military power — its signals pointed at multiple audiences.
Toward strategic competitors: signaling to a strong rival that any attempt at a preemptive strike against China's strategic forces — whether by nuclear weapons or by so-called precision conventional weapons in asymmetric strikes — cannot eliminate China's effective retaliation capability. The existence of a sea-based nuclear force renders "first strike" strategically meaningless.
Toward Japan: Shen Yi's analysis pointed out that Japan, which continues on the path of "reviving militarism," needs to draw several lessons from this test. First, the response of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs — which, after receiving the Chinese notification several hours before the launch, demanded that China "reconsider the ballistic missile launch training and not pass over Japanese airspace" — indirectly confirms that the missile trajectory may have crossed Japanese airspace. Second, China's export-control measures against Japan remain moderate and restrained, and the policy toolbox still holds rich options. Third, the perception that one can provoke China at no cost under the cover of America's extended nuclear deterrence needs to be comprehensively corrected.
Toward the region: Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong's characterization of the test as "destabilizing the Pacific region" reflected the anxiety of the U.S.–Australia alliance about the normalization of China's strategic forces. The Chinese response anchored the narrative in the framework of "routine arrangements, advance notification, in line with international law and international practice," refusing to be tagged with the "destabilizing" label.
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at the regular press briefing: "This is a routine arrangement for China's annual military training. We provided advance notification to the relevant countries beforehand. It is in line with international law and international practice. The relevant launch activities have consistently maintained safety standards and professional operation. We hope the relevant countries will not over-interpret this."
Narrative Counterpoint with the Land-Based Test
The September 2024 Dongfeng ICBM full-range test (retrospectively disclosed by CCTV in June 2026) and this submarine-launched strategic missile test form a precise narrative counterpoint:
- In time: one before, one after, spanning nearly two years, but both falling within the annual training framework
- In capability: land-based mobile → sea-based submarine-launched, covering the two pillars of nuclear force
- In narrative: the former is a "retrospective disclosure" — a subdued display; the latter is an "immediate announcement" — an explicit signal
- In target: the former focuses on "existential deterrence"; the latter focuses on "operational verification"
Military experts had previously analyzed that the 2024 launch demonstrated a combination of three elements: "field conditions, mobile launch, cold launch." This submarine-launched test added the sea-based concealed deployment and second-strike dimensions on that basis, advancing China's nuclear-deterrent picture from "having" to "credible."
The Targeted Embedding of the "Militarism Revival" Narrative Toward Japan
One noteworthy layer in Shen Yi's analysis is the direct linking of this test to Japan's domestic political trajectory. He explicitly pointed out that the lessons to draw include: returning to the post-war order constructed by the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation; recognizing that dual-use export controls are only moderate measures; and that no gray-zone action can escape countermeasures.
This analytical method of combining strategic-weapons testing with a Japan-targeted political narrative implies that the timing choice for this test — precisely against the backdrop of Japan accelerating its re-militarization and revising its security bills — carries an additional political-signaling function.
China's official narrative emphasizes that the test is "not directed at any specific country or target," but Shen Yi's analysis directly ties it to Japan-deterrence and cross-validates this with Japan's Foreign Ministry response. This two-layer narrative — official restraint + academic plainness — may itself be a deliberately designed signaling.
A Cross-Section Collection of International Responses
The international responses triggered by this test form a complete cross-section collection — from direct protest to strategic hedging, the various statements sketched out the test's geopolitical reach.
Japan: The Most Vehement Diplomatic-Protest-Style Notification
Japan was the country that reacted most strongly. According to Japanese media reports cited by Shen Yi, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after receiving the Ministry of National Defense's notification regarding the ballistic missile launch at 10:30 a.m. Beijing time on July 6, immediately demanded that China "reconsider the ballistic missile launch training and not pass over Japanese airspace, threatening Japan's security."
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, responding to Japanese media questions at the regular briefing, maintained a remarkably restrained tone: reiterating that this is a routine arrangement for annual military training, in line with international law and international practice, not directed at any specific country or target, and advising that "the relevant countries should not over-interpret this."
Notably, Shen Yi used the term "over-the-top" (越顶) when analyzing — combined with the Japanese Foreign Ministry's wording of "passing over Japanese airspace," the missile's range and trajectory altitude most likely exceeded the coverage of Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone, thereby constituting a de facto "over-the-top flight." Lingshi Xiantan subsequently commented with an illustration that the missile "basically went right over those two people's heads," describing that "someone let out a tearing, breaking-voice scream."
Australia: Same-Day Treaty Narrative Counterpart
Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, issuing a statement in Suva, the capital of Fiji, characterized the test as "destabilizing the Pacific region" and emphasized that "China plans to conduct this test against the backdrop of rapidly increasing military capability, but this lacks the transparency and intent assurances expected by the region."
This statement came on a day of considerable narrative significance: on the same day, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka signed in Suva a mutual defense treaty called the "Ocean Peace Alliance." This is the first mutual defense treaty Fiji has signed, and it is Australia's fourth mutual defense arrangement, following the 1951 ANZUS Treaty and the 2025 treaty with Papua New Guinea. The treaty explicitly stipulates that "if any party suffers an armed attack in the Pacific region, both sides shall act in accordance with their respective domestic procedures."
China's Foreign Ministry response maintained distance: spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated that China's cooperation with Pacific Island countries adheres to the principles of "mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit," refraining from geopolitical games, while subtly reminding that "we hope the relevant countries genuinely respect the independence and autonomy of the island nations … and do not target third parties."
New Zealand: Legal-Framework Protest Within a Nuclear-Free Zone
New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters expressed the most legally framed protest — emphasizing that the missile was fired into the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. This zone was established under the 1986 Treaty of Rarotonga; China ratified the relevant protocol in 1987 and pledged not to conduct nuclear-weapons tests within the nuclear-free zone. Peters pointed out: "Although we have long expressed concern about this type of activity, China conducted the test only hours after notifying us."
The core contradiction in this statement is: China declared it used a "training simulation warhead," so legally it does not count as a "nuclear-weapons test" — but New Zealand's statement implies that even a ballistic-missile launch itself (not involving nuclear warheads) violates the "spirit" of the nuclear-free zone.
The United States: The Absent Carrier Force and Strategic Anxiety
A report by Japan's Nikkei citing U.S. military statistics provided another key backdrop to this narrative: since January 2026, the U.S. military has deployed only one carrier strike group in the Western Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean — the first time since 2021. Washington has concentrated three of its seven available carriers in the Persian Gulf to pressure Iran, while the other four are in maintenance or technical checks.
In other words, when this submarine-launched strategic missile test took place, U.S. carrier power in the Western Pacific was at its lowest level in nearly five years. China, by contrast, has three carrier strike groups in the region. This short-term power imbalance amplifies the test's tactical-level deterrent weight — it demonstrates not only "second-strike capability," but also a deterrent verification carried out in a "window of opportunity."
Three events on the same day — China's SLBM test, the Australia–Fiji defense treaty signing, and the U.S. carrier vacuum in the Western Pacific — together constitute a delicate strategic moment. There may not be a causal chain among them, but their occurrence on the same day turns the South Pacific's "order contest" from an abstract topic into a competition profile with a concrete timestamp.
The Strategic Signal of Differentiated Notification — American Complaints and Deliberate Distinction
On July 9, Guancha (Observer), citing Reuters, disclosed a detail previously omitted from the official narrative: U.S. State Department officials complained that China had notified the U.S. side only hours before the launch and had not provided detailed specifics. Disclosed the same day: Japan received the formal notification only about 90 minutes before the launch, whereas allies such as Australia received the full notification a full day in advance.
This differentiation was not accidental. Chen Feng, a Guancha columnist, commented: "After Takaichi's 'Taiwan contingency' fallacy, China–Japan mutual trust has dropped to its lowest point. For a missile test, advance notification is a duty; a full day in advance is not owed." — the notification time difference itself becomes a form of diplomatic language: toward Japan, maintaining procedural compliance rather than strategic trust; toward Australia, preserving some degree of communication redundancy.
Three notification tracks — the U.S.'s complaint of "a few hours in advance," Japan's protest of "90 minutes," and Australia's confirmation of "a full day in advance" — together sketch out the tiered strategy China adopted in its strategic-weapons test notifications. Notification is a set of diplomatic signals, and the content of the signal includes not only the notification itself, but also its timing, its level of detail, and the choice of notification recipients.
From Strategic Strength to Strategic Confidence — The Post-Test Great-Power Mindset-Transition Cross-Section
Beneath the technical verification and diplomatic signaling of the submarine-launched strategic missile test, Shen Yi and Lingshi Xiantan successively published analyses on the evening of the same day, discussing this test within the framework of a "new-era diplomatic mindset transition" — constituting an independent "analytical framework" cross-section.
Shen Yi's Four-Layer Progression
Shen Yi published an analysis titled "Adjusting Mindset, Understanding the Basic Principles of the International System, and Doing Well in New-Era Chinese Diplomacy" at 20:44 on July 6, developing the argument across four mutually reinforcing layers.
Layer One: The Separation of Strength and Posture. Shen Yi pointed out that the mentality of compromising to seek peace is in essence "the core principle of weak-state diplomatic practice and the construction of weak-state mentality." Citing Henry Kissinger's judgment — "great powers set the rules of the game, other countries accept the rules of the game" — he believes that the core challenge for China in the new era is to complete a mindset adjustment: "do not hold a gold rice bowl and beg," carrying Dongfeng missiles, aircraft carriers, and drones while habitually adopting a weak-state posture.
Layer Two: The Cost of Excessive Modesty. The majority of actors in the current international system, Shen Yi calls "barbarians" — following a logic of bullying the soft and fearing the hard, of taking advantage wherever possible. Excessive modesty is not a virtue in this environment; it is a strategic fallacy. If you give three points of color, the other side dares to climb on your face — this observation directly collides China's traditional diplomatic restraint with the realities of international politics.
Layer Three: One-Sided Wishful Thinking Is the Real Problem. The key line of judgment is: "In international relations and diplomatic strategy, talking about interests has never been a problem. The problem is failing to figure out how much interest your strength can secure and then acting up." Shen Yi used the metaphors of "a milk-dragon thinking it can bomb Iran into submission" and "Tang Sanzang thinking he can use compassion to convert demons," criticizing three typical forms of one-sided wishfulness: the belief that strength naturally brings respect; the belief that goodwill will be reciprocated; and the belief that rules will constrain those who ignore rules.
Layer Four: Missile Range Is Also a Language. "Today's China, reminding you 90 minutes in advance that a ballistic missile will borrow your airspace — that is the respect for the international order and rules." Extending this logic: the reach of one's strength determines the weight of one's voice. Shen Yi's core appeal was: "China, which has an overwhelming strength advantage, must adopt a manner of speaking and acting that matches its strength."
"Otherwise, those countries will not think that China is moderate and rational — they will only think that China's strength is fake."
The 1988 Counterpoint — The Nuclear-Submarine Test and the Resilience of Scientific Survival
At 20:45 the same day, Shen Yi released a photo from the 1988 first-ever nuclear-submarine strategic missile test. The young man in the commander's seat that year had graduated only six years earlier — when next seen years later, he was already a deputy director. Asked what he did during the years after 1988 when, for economic reasons, nuclear-submarine research was halted, his answer was that he had developed refrigerator compressors, and also engineered a chopstick-making machine for export chopsticks bound for Japan.
This recollection sets the 2026 public declaration and the 1988 quiet persistence as a 38-year-spanning reference: the former is a military-diplomatic signal release; the latter reveals, on a human dimension, the institutional resilience behind strategic-weapons projects — in the late-1980s hyperinflation, military R&D departments first solved the problem of "survival." "This is also why the construction of the nuclear triad has taken such a long road" — Shen Yi did not say this explicitly, but the 1988 story itself answers the question.
From the 1988 commander who later engineered a chopstick-making machine, to the 2026 Navy publicly announcing the successful SLBM test — the span of this history is more than just timeline nodes on a technical roadmap.
Lingshi Xiantan: From Enduring Grievance to Contending for Rights
Lingshi Xiantan's analysis at 21:05 used the same test as an entry point but was even more direct than Shen Yi's — directly rejecting "enduring grievance to preserve the whole" as a valid diplomatic strategy: "Enduring grievance cannot preserve the whole; only contention can safeguard interests."
His line of reasoning further concretized Shen Yi's abstract framework: demanding a shift from a "weak-state diplomatic mindset" to a diplomatic posture commensurate with "current strength." A notable term is "industrial Cthulhu" — a concept drawn from internet culture that describes the scale and overwhelming strength of China's manufacturing capacity. Lingshi Xiantan introduced it directly into diplomatic discussion, reflecting a signal: strong manufacturing strength needs to be expressed in matching diplomatic language.
Shen Yi and Lingshi Xiantan's analyses converge on a single judgment: this SLBM test has triggered a systematic "mindset calibration" in Chinese foreign-policy discussion — from the traditional philosophical framework of restraint and courtesy toward a more confident external posture commensurate with comprehensive national power. The discussion itself may be more worth recording than the missile's range data, because it points to the underlying logic of long-term strategic behavior.
Official Calibration and the Full Set of Diplomatic Responses
On the evening of July 7, the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson and the Foreign Ministry spokesperson issued formal responses to the SLBM test in succession, while the Solomon Islands prime minister's protest added a fresh narrative counterpart to the test's international response.
The Ministry of National Defense's Formal Calibration
Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Chen Xi, answering reporters' questions on the evening of July 7 regarding the Navy's organization of the SLBM test, provided the most complete official-narrative version:
"A PLA Navy strategic nuclear submarine organized a submarine-launched strategic missile launch and achieved the expected results. This is a routine arrangement for annual military training, in line with international law and international practice. China provided advance notification to the relevant countries, reflecting the openness and transparency of the Chinese military. China adheres to the path of peaceful development, pursues a defensive national defense policy, abides by a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and always maintains its nuclear force at the minimum level required for national security — and does not engage in nuclear arms races with any country. Our push to modernize our nuclear force is intended to safeguard national strategic security and maintain global strategic stability."
Chen Xi's response carries signal significance on three levels:
First, "achieved the expected results" — this is the most direct official confirmation of the test's outcome. Compared with the more restrained wording of the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the Ministry of National Defense's statement leaves no ambiguity that the launch "succeeded."
Second, "advance notification was provided to the relevant countries" — directly responding to the core of protests from Japan and others ("no sufficient advance notification"), characterizing the notification behavior as a manifestation of "openness and transparency." This articulation had been omitted or downplayed in earlier official narratives; the July 7 response deliberately filled in this element.
Third, "does not engage in nuclear arms races with any country" — against the backdrop of Australian Foreign Minister Wong's "destabilizing" characterization and NATO Secretary General's "cannot be taken lightly" framing, the Ministry of National Defense used the three keywords "minimum level," "defensive," and "self-defensive" to demarcate the official-narrative floor, attempting to distance itself from the Western "Chinese nuclear expansion" framing.
Shen Yi's Reading of the Solomon Islands Protest
At 20:48 the same day, Shen Yi posted a pointed comment targeting the formal protest by Solomon Islands Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele against China's SLBM test.
According to reports, Manele, in his capacity as chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, delivered a protest letter to the Chinese ambassador: "We do not want anyone to test-launch ICBMs in the Pacific region. You can be our friends, but do not threaten us."
Shen Yi's response directly unraveled the double standard within it: on March 3, when a U.S. Minuteman III ICBM flew 6,700 kilometers and landed at the Kwajalein test site in the Marshall Islands, Manele said nothing; on May 20, when the U.S. military fired another Minuteman III whose impact point was also in the South Pacific, again silent; but as soon as China's "Julang" appeared, the new prime minister started to bark.
"Right, they clearly don't recognize the new model and only recognize Minuteman, not Julang. Their climate-change education must have been poor — they only know that recognizing Minuteman can earn them money."
Behind the sarcastic remarks lies a serious fact: prior to this test, China's submarine-launched ballistic missiles had never been officially used to conduct an open full-range test in the South Pacific. The Solomon Islands' protest is less an objection to the missile itself than a manifestation of being "unaccustomed" — accustomed to accepting the fait accompli of U.S. Minuteman III impact points on its doorstep, but unaccustomed to the appearance of Chinese strategic weapons in the same region.
Filling Out the Spectrum of International Responses
Compared with the initial response lineup on July 6 (Japan's protest, the Australia–Fiji treaty signing, New Zealand's legal-framework protest), the July 7 evening responses provided two previously omitted cross-sections:
- Completeness of the official narrative: the Ministry of National Defense's first complete statement characterized the test as "annual routine" and confirmed the advance notification, supplementing the restrained Foreign Ministry narrative
- The Pacific Island states' concrete response: the Solomon Islands prime minister's protest, in his capacity as PIF chair, revealed the existence of another voice among Pacific Island states — distinct from the alliance-style hedging of Australia and Fiji, and distinct from the legal-framework protest of New Zealand, this was a direct "friends don't do this" style of diplomatic engagement
These two cross-sections together constitute the response progression from July 6 to July 7: from technical surprise to diplomatic engagement, from alliance response to island-nation voice, from "what happened" to "what it means."
The Two-Successive-Launch Military Signal — The Strategic-Verification Closed Loop from Land to Sea
On July 8, CCTV Military, in its coverage, conducted a parallel analysis of the September 2024 and July 2026 launches, reading them as "two successive launches within two years" delivering three nuclear signals.
Signal One: The strategic nuclear triad is being steadily consolidated. Land-based (the September 2024 Rocket Force ICBM) and sea-based (the July 2026 Navy SLBM) have successively completed operational verification. The publicization of an air-based nuclear-delivery capability is only a matter of time.
Signal Two: The capability to counter nuclear threats and blackmail and to break nuclear monopoly has further strengthened. Both launches demonstrate China's leap from "having" to "credible" in nuclear deterrence — land-based mobile launch demonstrated survivability; sea-based submarine launch demonstrated the existence of a second-strike capability.
Signal Three: Adherence to a self-defensive nuclear strategy. Both launches provided advance notification, used training simulation warheads, and were characterized as routine annual exercises — the practice of proactive transparency is itself an operational expression of the self-defensive nuclear strategy.
Military Expert Deng Qiyuan's Analytical Framework
The same day, military commentator Deng Qiyuan, in an interview with Sputnik, provided a more systematic analytical framework:
"Land-based ICBM sites are easy to be located by reconnaissance; air-based nuclear delivery vehicles face many penetration constraints; but strategic nuclear submarines, relying on concealment and mobility in deep water, possess extremely strong wartime survivability and are the core vehicle for second nuclear strike."
He situated the test within the context that among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, only China, the United States, and Russia truly possess a complete triad of land-sea-air strategic nuclear strike capabilities — and laid out four analytical threads:
First, the maturity confirmation of sea-based nuclear force as the pillar of second nuclear strike. This successful underwater launch proves that China's strategic nuclear submarines, the Julang-series submarine-launched ICBMs, and the underwater launch support systems are stable and reliable across the entire chain. Once a first nuclear strike is suffered, strategic nuclear submarines lurking in the deep sea can independently execute retaliation.
Second, the complete thread of land-sea nuclear force iteration. Following the routine test-launch of land-based ICBMs in 2024, this open submarine-launched strategic missile launch into the Pacific, combined with the earlier public debut of the new-generation Julang-III SLBM and the new-generation strategic nuclear submarine, forms a complete picture of land-sea nuclear force renewal.
Third, the strategic confidence embodied in proactive notification. The advance notification of navigation and airspace safety information to foreign parties — distinguishing it from the normalized, unwarned nuclear-force exercises of some countries — demonstrates the transparency and restraint of China's nuclear policy. Deng Qiyuan believes this open, standardized test mode itself signals confidence: a mature nuclear force does not need secrecy and provocation to maintain deterrence.
Fourth, the back-pressure effect of the external security environment. Against the backdrop of intensifying global geopolitical contests, continuous escalation of various external military provocations around China, and ongoing nuclear-proliferation risks, some countries keep advancing targeted military alliances. This test objectively forms a powerful deterrent to external forces that rely on military pressure and nuclear blackmail to contain China's development.
Chang'anjie Zhishi's "two-successive-launches" narrative focuses on the transmission of official signals — consolidate, strengthen, adhere — a layered capability-demonstration narrative. Deng Qiyuan's analysis places technical verification, institutional confidence, and strategic deterrence within the same framework — the publicization of capability is itself a form of deterrence.
The Diplomatic Contest of Flying Over Japan and East-Asia Cognitive Warfare — Shen Yi and Sanmei's Live-Stream Deep Dive
On July 9, 2026, Shen Yi and Sanmei conducted an 87-minute deep dive on this missile test in their "Shen Yi Observation" live stream, covering multiple layers untouched by the official narrative and prior analyses.
Trajectory Reconstruction: From Coast Guard Notices to a Three-Point Line
In the live stream, Shen Yi reproduced a logical chain that reverse-engineered the missile's trajectory from public information:
On July 5, the Coast Guard in two directions — Guangdong (粤) and Liaoning (辽) — each issued rocket-splash-warning sea areas. The position of the Yuanwang tracking ship coincided with the inferred missile landing zone. Combining these public coordinates into a three-point-line projection — the Coast Guard notice areas, the Yuanwang position, and the four-cornered region warned by Japanese radio — the fact that the missile flew over Japanese airspace required no official confirmation and could be inferred directly from open information.
"Note that the Chinese notice says advance notification was given to the relevant countries … in the end, whoever's head it passed over is the one who got notified."
The Secret of the Tiered Notification Chain
Shen Yi's analysis revealed a previously under-discussed diplomatic hierarchy:
- Australia: full notification received 24 hours in advance (highest tier)
- Japan: diplomatic notification 90 minutes in advance (middle tier)
- United States: Department of Defense notification a few hours in advance, but the message was not promptly relayed to the State Department
The third point is especially worth noting. Shen Yi speculated that China notified the U.S. side through the Department-of-Defense channel, but the personal tensions between Hegseth (Secretary of Defense) and Rubio (Secretary of State) caused the DOD notification not to be relayed in time to the State Department. The U.S. State Department, twelve hours later, dispatched only one official to issue a formulaic statement — urging Chinese nuclear transparency and demanding advance notification — rather than any substantive response to the test itself. Trump himself made no statement the entire time, save for one remark: "Welcome the Chinese leader to come on September 24, hurry up and fix up my garden!"
Shen Yi attributed this information-transfer breakdown to a combination of two personal factors: Hegseth, inside the Pentagon, was preoccupied with "manly push-ups, purging dissidents, demonstrating loyalty" and other non-professional tasks, and a highly specialized business like missile notification was not on his priority list; meanwhile, Rubio and Hegseth's inherent competitive relationship made the transfer of information between different departments even harder.
Japan's Psychological Vulnerability: The Cultural Code of Evangelion and Ultraman
Shen Yi, in his reading of Japan's response, offered a dimension of analysis that had not previously appeared on existing Wiki pages — the cultural-psychological vulnerability of Japan's island population.
The Japanese island population lives in an extremely harsh natural environment (tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions occurring at any time), and this survival environment has culturally forged a profound sense of "insecurity" and "fragility." From the sudden attacks of Angels in Neon Genesis Evangelion, to the extraterrestrial monsters falling from the sky in Ultraman — the recurring "unannounced external attack" motif in Japanese pop culture is a projection of this collective psychology.
With this missile flying over Japanese airspace, the same psychological mechanism was triggered: Japan had just politically angered China, and then discovered its own airspace being "punched through" by a Chinese ICBM — and there was nothing Japan could do about it. The destructive power of an ICBM is orders of magnitude above that of conventional weapons — "if this thing hits, Japan is gone" — but the Japanese government has neither the ability to mount an equivalent response nor the ability to protect its own citizens.
The outlet for the anxiety became cognitive warfare. Joseph Wu (Wu Chao-hsieh) was the first to post on platform X denying that the missile had flown over Japan, the Yomiuri Shimbun followed with reporting, and Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary came out to say "no overflight of airspace" — Shen Yi pointed out: "Whenever any missile overflight happens, if anyone starts talking to you about 'airspace,' that's the beginning of them trying to fool you," because ICBM trajectories always lie outside airspace altitude.
"Don't look up! Don't look up! Learn from Joseph Wu, use Joseph Wu's X post to save your life … the mainland must be staring in disbelief — how can they be so fragile, making such a fuss, a whole bunch of lunatics!"
Julang's Technical Details: Launch Angle Reveals Quality
Shen Yi also made a quality judgment about Julang from publicly available footage: the quality of an SLBM can be judged by the angle at the moment of surfacing. The more vertical the missile's emergence, the more mature the underwater attitude control. The footage of this test showed the missile surfacing at almost a right angle — "if you draw a straight line downward, it is basically at a right angle to the sea surface." This means the underwater cold-launch technology is already very mature, and the attitude control precision of the missile body is very high.
He argued that China's 37.5-kilometer desert test track in Xinjiang (simulating the trajectory of a U.S. carrier strike group's highest-speed maneuver to evade missiles) and the full-scale carrier target, together with the Western-Pacific missile test, constitute a "tactical-tier" and "strategic-tier" dual-track deterrent. The desert target was never officially mentioned by the PLA — "we silently practice our craft there, while a bunch of satellites up in the sky are squealing away" — this kind of low profile is itself a deterrent posture.
The Cross-Validation of International Perspectives — Multi-Layer Readings of U.S. Media Experts on China's SLBM Test
On July 10, Lingshi Xiantan compiled an Associated Press analysis article that provided an important external perspective on this missile test. Three experts — Tong Zhao (senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nuclear Policy Program), Dominic Meagher (researcher at the Australian Crawford School of Public Policy), and Kevin Tang (non-resident researcher at the National Bureau of Asian Research) — offered analyses that, from an American viewpoint, revealed the strategic-signal layers of the test.
The Operational Verification of Triad Sea-Based Capability
"The most important message is that the PLA is becoming a strong military with very strong strategic nuclear capability."
Tong Zhao's judgment points directly at the test's essential signal: this is not a test but a capability declaration. China is completing its transformation from "possessing nuclear weapons" to "possessing a deployable strategic nuclear force."
The Institutional Confirmation of Second-Strike Capability
Dominic Meagher emphasized that the test demonstrated China's second-strike capability — even after being attacked first, China can still execute effective retaliation through its sea-based nuclear deployment. Meagher's wording is worth noting: he uses "possesses" rather than "is developing" to describe this capability. This marks a shift in mainstream Western academia's perception of the credibility of China's nuclear deterrent — from "potential" to "reality."
A Systematic Initiative, Not an Isolated Event
Kevin Tang's judgment is the most concise: "I think this is a systematic initiative, not an isolated event." This formulation forms a cross-source mutual confirmation with the "land-to-sea strategic verification closed loop" emphasized in Shen Yi's earlier analysis: China's nuclear force is shifting from single-dimensional demonstrations toward a systematic, multi-platform, high-frequency capability-display rhythm.
South Pacific Island-States' Concern and a New Dimension of U.S.–China Contest
The AP report also revealed a previously under-discussed dimension: the attitude of the South Pacific's small island states. The leaders of these countries are increasingly urging great powers to cease using Pacific international waters for power contests. The missile's impact point lay in the South Pacific — China's second missile test in this region within two years — and this forms a parallel military-contest line with the continuously growing U.S. military presence in the South Pacific (AUKUS nuclear-submarine agreement, expansion of Australian military bases).
Lingshi Xiantan's compiled AP analysis reads this test as "a warning to the United States from China," while China's official narrative framework is "annual routine exercise." The two narratives are not contradictory at the "signal" level — the more a military action is defined as "routine," the higher the certainty of its signaling.
Reuters Exclusive: Command-Chain Communication Challenges and the Operational Verification of the Type 094 Submarine
On the evening of July 10, Reuters published a more technically detailed analysis, shifting the focus from "whether it is a warning" to "how deterrence is achieved."
"In addition to examining the actual technical capabilities of the missile and the submarine, command, control, and maintaining communications with a stealth-operating nuclear submarine were undoubtedly also heavily evaluated."
This judgment reveals a core issue omitted from public discussion: the deterrent value of a nuclear submarine depends not only on the missile's range and accuracy, but also on the reliability of the command chain. For a strategic nuclear submarine stealthily cruising underwater, how to receive launch orders while maintaining concealment, how to ensure the order chain cannot be jammed or severed — these communication-layer complexities are the key difficulty distinguishing sea-based nuclear force from land-based fixed silos and mobile launchers.
Reuters further confirmed the launch platform: one of China's six Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN). The Type 094 is currently the most advanced strategic nuclear submarine in active service in China, specifically designed to launch ICBMs carrying nuclear warheads. Analysts noted that although challenges remain, the core message conveyed by this test is:
"They may be trying to show that even if they cannot reach the U.S. mainland in range, they can still target Guam and Hawaii."
The Ministry of National Defense, responding to a Reuters question the same day, characterized part of the foreign-media coverage as "pure distortion and hype," and reiterated that China's push to modernize its nuclear force is aimed at safeguarding national strategic security and maintaining global strategic stability. This response retained the phrase "nuclear-force modernization" — implicitly acknowledging the nuclear-strike backdrop information of the test, while framing it within the "defensive" narrative framework.
Southeast Asia's Response — Indonesia's Rational Statement and the South-China-Sea Arbitration Ten-Year Anniversary Counterpoint
In contrast to the tense responses from Japan and the United States, Indonesia's statement is worth recording. On July 9, Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Yvonne Mewengkang made a notable response at a press conference.
Indonesia "highly regards this ballistic-missile test," while emphasizing that international law does not prohibit states from possessing ballistic missiles or conducting related tests. The advance notification issued by China "helps enhance transparency and is an important measure for maintaining the international community's trust."
This statement has two noteworthy aspects.
First, Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia and a direct party to the South China Sea disputes. Around the ten-year anniversary of the "South China Sea Arbitration Award" on July 12, Indonesia chose to provide legitimacy backing for China's missile test on the basis of international law — a subtle temperature gap from some countries' "China threat" narratives.
Second, the logic of Indonesia's statement is itself a reusable analytical framework: acknowledging the sovereign right of states (to develop and test ballistic missiles) + affirming the trust value of advance notification (transparency) + not presupposing an adversarial stance (concerned but not opposing). This framework both safeguards Indonesia's diplomatic autonomy and does not reduce the regional security dilemma to a simple one-sided attribution of military behavior.
Indonesia's statement is largely consistent with the response pattern of other South China Sea neighboring countries to previous Chinese missile tests: regional countries are more concerned with procedural transparency than with the test itself — a fundamental perspective gap from the Western "threat narrative" framework.
The Parallel Signal — The Public Reporting of the Dongfeng-17 and Symmetric Deterrence
The same day, Chinese official media publicly displayed footage of the Dongfeng-17 hypersonic missile. Shen Yi noted in a reposted comment that the timing of the public reporting — coming right after the U.S.-led 2026 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise — was itself part of the message.
Taiwanese strategist Huang Jie-cheng's analysis offered an interpretive framework: the Dongfeng-17 is about 11 meters in length, with a range of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers, capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads. China possesses approximately 1,300 related missiles and some 300 launch vehicles, making it the most mature hypersonic missile system in the world today. CSIS's assessment noted that the Dongfeng-17's uniqueness lies in its hypersonic glide vehicle — "this maneuverability means that it is much harder to defeat than traditional ballistic missiles without hypersonic glide vehicles."
Putting these two pieces of information together, a more complete deterrent picture emerges:
- Submarine-launched ballistic missile (strategic tier): Type 094 SSBN + Julang series — ensuring second-strike capability
- Dongfeng-17 (operational tier): hypersonic glide vehicle + mobile launch vehicles — penetrating regional missile-defense systems
Two pieces of information released on the same day form a "full-spectrum deterrent" signal crossing the strategic and operational tiers: the ability to strike Guam/Hawaii (sea-based, strategic tier) + the ability to penetrate missile-defense systems (land-based, operational tier) + nearly identical official-narrative framing (annual routine / defensive national defense policy).
Systematic Reaffirmation — The Federation of American Scientists Annual Report's Comprehensive Assessment of China's Nuclear Forces in 2026
On July 13, Shen Yi, in a reposted comment, systematically introduced the latest report published by the FAS Nuclear Information Project team in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, titled "China's Nuclear Weapons 2026," which provided a comprehensive assessment from the U.S. strategic community on the trajectory of China's nuclear forces.
The report's core judgment: China currently possesses approximately 620 nuclear warheads, the fastest-growing nuclear stockpile among the world's nine nuclear states. Over the past decade, China's nuclear forces have visibly accelerated, transitioning from a "small-scale minimum deterrence" model toward a more complete and more powerful nuclear-force system. This judgment is consistent with the narrative of the SLBM test — it is not an isolated capability demonstration but the latest verification node of the entire transformation process.
The three cross-sections of the triad. The report fully sketched the land-sea-air triad that China is building:
Land-based capability centers on the DF-41 ICBM and new solid-fuel missile silo clusters, while continuing to expand DF-5 liquid-fuel ICBM bases. The report believes this means China is increasing survivability and second-strike capability — the hardening and dispersion of silo-based missiles make them difficult to destroy in a single surprise attack.
Sea-based capability: Type 094 strategic nuclear submarines are being re-equipped with the JL-3 (Julang-3) SLBM. The report particularly notes that JL-3's range gain enables Chinese submarines to threaten more distant targets from coastal bastion areas. The R&D progress of the next-generation Type 096 strategic nuclear submarine is listed as the most important variable in "future trends" — its stealth, missile payload, and continuous patrol capability will further enhance the persistence of China's sea-based nuclear deterrent.
Air-based capability: the report points out that some H-6 bombers may already have undertaken nuclear missions, with related weapons including air-launched ballistic missiles and new long-range air-launched nuclear weapons. This means China is restoring an air-launched nuclear-strike capability that had been interrupted since the retirement of early-model H-6 bombers — completing the third pillar of the triad.
From "minimum deterrence" to "great-power nuclear balance." The report's narrative framework marks a shift worth noting: it no longer describes China's nuclear force as a maintainer of "minimum deterrence," but positions it as a nuclear force heading toward long-term strategic competition with the United States. Beyond the growth rate of warhead numbers, the report pays greater attention to the institutional and industrial infrastructure that China is building — silo clusters, underground facilities, continuous production-line operation — these lend "speed" itself a quality of persistence.
China's official position still insists on a "no first use" declaration and has not explicitly abandoned the "minimum" nuclear-force formulation. But the real question the report raises is: what scale counts as "minimum"? When the number of nuclear warheads moves from less than 300 (a decade ago) to 620 (current estimate) and onward toward 1,000 (2030 projection), the very definition of "minimum" is shifting.
Shen Yi, in a reposted comment, closed his reading of the report with one line:
"All this talk about lack of transparency is nonsense — whatever China wants to do has been publicly stated countless times. The anxiety of the U.S. and the West is not about 'not knowing what China wants to do' — it is about 'knowing what China wants to do, but being powerless to stop it.'"
This judgment shelves the report's "transparency" narrative and points directly at the underlying logic of the issue — China's nuclear-force transformation is not an information problem, but a capability-growth problem. When you know what the other party is doing yet have no means to alter that trajectory, attributing your anxiety to "information deficit" is an easier self-comfort than admitting powerlessness.
A Footnote on Deep-Sea Penetration — Nuclear Submarine Surfacing Beside a Foreign Warship (Increment 2026-08-01)
Within the August 1 military-power narrative, one easily overlooked thread remained. That evening, Shen Yi reposted a piece of content and commented: "Was it that one time, when it just surfaced right next to that guy — gave him a real fright" — accompanying the hashtag #ChineseSubmarineAmbushDisclosed#.
This comment pulls nuclear-submarine deterrence back from "launching missiles" to "covert approach": deep-sea penetration, getting close to a foreign warship, is another form of sea-based nuclear-force deterrence — not speaking through missiles, but speaking through "I can get to your side without you detecting me." This forms two sides of the same coin as the SLBM test recorded earlier on this page: missiles solve "can reach," penetration solves "stays alive, gets close."
Reaffirming the Value of Nuclear Submarines — The China–Russia Joint Exercise Submarine Display and the Second-Strike Logic (Increment 2026-08-06)
On August 6, military blogger Tie Yu Huo – Bai Mengchen, analyzing the submarine display in the China–Russia joint exercise, brought the value of nuclear submarines back to the most basic logic: nuclear submarines are a reliable second-strike platform, and only a sufficiently strong retaliation capability can deter other countries' preemptive nuclear strikes.
The core judgment of this analysis lies in the divergence of nuclear-strategy philosophy. China pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy, different from the preemptive-strike philosophy of the United States and Russia — therefore Chinese nuclear submarines focus on underwater survivability and penetration capability, rather than on striking first. Faced with the leading underwater forces and unmanned-underwater-vehicle threats of the U.S. and Russia, China's nuclear submarines are developing steadily, adhering to the "sufficiency principle," and will not proactively start a nuclear arms race.
Placed in the context of this page, this analysis closes the loop on "deterrence form": Section 7 (FAS report) and the "Air-Based Pillar" section have recorded the equipment progress of the triad, while this section answers "why nuclear submarines" — the reliability of retaliation capability is the prerequisite for deterrence to hold. The submarine display in the China–Russia joint exercise displays exactly this "can hide, can strike" second-strike capability. The formulations of a self-defensive nuclear strategy and the "sufficiency principle" simultaneously send an external signal: China will not participate in a nuclear arms race, but it will maintain a retaliation capability sufficient to make opponents abandon the idea of a first strike.
Earlier sections recorded the SLBM test (sea-based verification), the FAS report (overall assessment), and the H-6N air-based same-frame (air-based completion); this section adds the methodology layer of "why nuclear submarines" — the second-strike deterrence logic and the divergence of nuclear-strategy philosophy among China, the U.S., and Russia, lifting the triad framework from "equipment inventory" to "deterrence logic."
The Air-Based Pillar Filled In — The H-6N and Jinglei-1 Public Same-Frame (Increment 2026-08-05)
On August 5, the PLA's new film "Triumph" featured a combination previously only seen at military parades: the H-6N stealth bomber, escorted by two J-20s, with the "Jinglei-1" air-based long-range missile mounted on its belly — Sputnik's reported judgment was that this missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, has been declassified and was first publicly displayed at the September 2025 Beijing parade. This is the first time China has used finished footage to display its capability to conduct aerial nuclear strikes.
In the context of this page, this missile fills in the historically shortest board of the triad framework. Section 7 (FAS Annual Report) has already recorded the assessment of the "restoration" of air-based nuclear capability, while this official propaganda film turns "restoration" from text into imagery: the bomber platform (H-6N), the escort formation (J-20), and the ordnance (Jinglei-1) — all three are in place; what is being displayed is no longer "whether it exists," but "how it is used" — long-range air-based strikes under penetration escort.
Earlier sections recorded the SLBM (sea-based), the FAS report (overall assessment), and the nuclear-submarine penetration (deterrence form) from three angles of the triad; this section adds the official visual evidence of the air-based pillar, forming a timeline with the September 2025 parade's static display: parade debut first, then finished-film display of operational form.
The Scarborough Shoal Live-Munition Drill — The H-6J and YJ-12 Operational Deterrence (Increment 2026-08-09)
On August 8, CCTV's "Military Time" disclosed detailed footage from the August 1 Southern Theater Command sea–air joint drill at Scarborough Shoal: the H-6J strategic bomber appeared at the drill site, with four missiles slung under its wings. Military commentator Zhang Xuefeng, judging from the external shape, identified these four as YJ-12 anti-ship missiles — strong penetration capability, high flight speed, and great destructive power; "a single hit can effectively cripple the opponent's large surface warship — one could even say it's a carrier killer."
This analysis laid out the H-6 family lineage very clearly: the H-6 is nicknamed "Sixth Grandfather" by military enthusiasts; the H-6K is a modified variant; the H-6J is improved from the H-6K based on maritime-combat requirements, with no major changes to the airframe structure — its main function is to strike maritime and shore-based targets — even without an air-patrol capability, it can still effectively strike key targets on the "first island chain" and form deterrence against large warships within the "second island chain."
Earlier sections recorded the H-6N and Jinglei-1 air-based nuclear same-frame; this section adds the conventional strike face of the same platform family — the H-6J with YJ-12, demonstrating the "conventional deterrent" use of air-based power. The nuclear-warhead version (Jinglei-1) handles strategic deterrence; the conventional anti-ship version (YJ-12) handles theater-area denial and anti-access; both share the same platform family, forming a two-layer deterrent structure for air-based power.
The program also drew on a popular saying from the military-enthusiast community to underscore the weight of "one": "We don't fear Sixth Grandfather carrying many; we fear Sixth Grandfather carrying one" — this "one" many enthusiasts believe to be the Jinglei-1. Zhang Xuefeng noted that the H-6N, improved from the H-6K, has structural changes, a longer range, can refuel in the air, and more importantly, can carry nuclear-capable missiles; the Jinglei-1 is an air-based nuclear missile with a range of several thousand kilometers — it can even be launched over national airspace, and with special penetration measures, it is hard for the other side to intercept — this endows China with a "triad" nuclear-strike capability.
The visual language of the Scarborough Shoal drill is direct: the H-6J, with four YJ-12s, appears in the South China Sea direction, sending the signal that "conventional anti-ship deterrence is in place"; the military-enthusiast consensus of "fear the one" points to the nuclear option of the same platform family. From the parade's static display, to the "Triumph" propaganda film's same-frame, to the drill field's live-munition load — the path of air-based power from "showing existence" to "operational deployment" is coherently visible in these three appearances.
The Geneva Legal Confrontation — Li Chijiang's Rebuttal of U.S. "Missile-Test Notification" Criticism (Increment 2026-08-12)
On August 11, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the United States and other countries delivered a so-called joint statement on "ballistic-missile launch notification," groundlessly criticizing China's July SLBM test. Li Chijiang, China's ambassador for disarmament affairs, immediately delivered a stern rebuttal on the spot: China's goodwill gesture of advance missile-launch notification should not be held hostage to geopolitical calculation.
The rebuttal was articulated in three clear layers. The first is the question of standing — the U.S. invoked the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, a voluntary political commitment, to demand advance notification from China, but China is not a member of that "Code" and is not bound by it; China has consistently and safely, in a standardized and responsible manner, conducted ICBM tests and provided advance notification to the U.S. and others — this is goodwill, not obligation. The second is accounting — China has to date conducted only three ICBM tests, the fewest among the five nuclear states; the U.S. is the world's most frequent ICBM-tester, and has not seriously fulfilled its own notification responsibilities, and therefore has no standing to demand perfection from China. The third is characterization — the U.S. inducement of some non–Conference-on-Disarmament member states into joining the joint statement constitutes "typical political manipulation and naked double standards" — "megaphone diplomacy" on a grand scale.
This page previously recorded the technical signal and capability verification of the test itself; this section adds the post-test diplomatic contest — the same missile, military-wise an operational verification of triad capability, and diplomatic-wise a target of attack at the Conference on Disarmament. The U.S. turning an "advance-notified goodwill test" into a target of joint-statement criticism exactly illustrates the missile's strategic weight: anything that can draw a U.S.-convened international criticism meeting must really have struck where it hurts.
Li Chijiang's rebuttal performs a subtraction in legal terms: dismantling the U.S.-invoked "Code" into "non-member, not bound" — a voluntary political commitment carries no binding force on non-signatories; that is the ABCs of international law. He then uses the test-count accounting to separate "goodwill" from "obligation." China's position is: notification is goodwill, not notification is its right; demanding a right on the basis of goodwill is a double standard.
The Joint Statement's Frontstage and Backstage — The 40-Country "24-Hour Notification" Roster (Increment 2026-08-12)
The text of the joint statement rebuked by Li Chijiang emerged that afternoon: the U.S. Mission to the United Nations Office in Geneva posted on its website a joint statement in which the United States and 40 other countries jointly called on all states — particularly those possessing nuclear weapons — to provide notification at least 24 hours in advance when launching ICBMs, SLBMs, and space launch vehicles. The notification is to include missile class, planned launch time, launch area, and launch direction.
The signatory list reveals the convening logic of this action: nearly all NATO European member states (Albania, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, North Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United States, Turkey, Ukraine, Finland, France, Croatia, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Estonia), plus Asia-Pacific direction countries (South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand), plus a few Pacific Island states (the Marshall Islands, Palau) — the list itself is a miniature alliance map. Neither Russia nor China is on it.
Earlier sections recorded China's rebuttal position on the "ballistic-missile-launch notification" issue; this section adds the textual details of the U.S. position. Set side by side, the parties' disagreement is not on "whether to notify" — China also emphasizes that its own "advance notification" is a goodwill measure — but on "in whose name, toward whom, and binding on whom." The U.S. packages a voluntary political initiative as the moral high ground of a multilateral joint statement; China refuses to allow voluntary goodwill to be written into a binding clause. This 40-country list also answers the implicit question of the previous section: when Li Chijiang rebuked "certain countries' abuse of the Conference on Disarmament platform," he meant whom — and whom they had pulled in.
The 40-country joint statement specifies "advance 24-hour notification" into four fields — missile class, launch time, launch area, launch direction — this is not an appeal but a ready-made verification checklist. And the structure of the list shows its targeting: full NATO + Indo-Pacific allies + Pacific Island states, exactly the complete lineup of the 2026 summer military contest in the Pacific direction. The U.S.'s "joint statement" at the Conference on Disarmament and the "joint statement" on the Mission's website are two sides of the same coin: one applies moral pressure, the other sets operational rules.