On May 24, 2026, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić was set to depart for China. Viewed only through the lens of a foreign-ministry communiqué, it was just one more iteration of the high-level exchanges between China and Serbia in recent years. But a long-form dispatch filed by Bloomberg from Belgrade revealed that the tensions behind this visit were far more complex than diplomatic language would suggest: Vučić was about to sign dozens of cooperation agreements — spanning computer chips, robotics, and infrastructure — while the European Union was using the word "red line" to define a Southeastern Europe over which it finds it increasingly difficult to exert influence.
Bloomberg's own headline betrayed the anxiety of its narrative. Rather than framing the story as "Vučić visits China to advance bilateral cooperation," it reached for "EU draws red line on China-Serbia ties" — the implication being that Serbia is "closing in on" some boundary the EU has laid down. The word choice carries a worry: a boundary only means something if it is observed. But if the party testing it keeps pushing forward and the line is never enforced, then the "red line" becomes a prop for bluffing.
An anonymous EU official claimed that the bloc had already told Vučić that further increases in Chinese investment would affect Serbia's path to EU membership.
— Bloomberg, May 22, 2026
The Inner Contradictions of the Red Line
The EU's rhetorical predicament grows out of the collision of two structural contradictions.
First, the credibility of the promise is depreciating. Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009 and became a candidate country in 2012 — in the fourteen years since, accession negotiations have repeatedly stalled on judicial, economic, and other issues, never breaking through. The EU's "red line" toward Serbia rests on a promise that has not been delivered: the EU uses "joining the Union" as leverage to discipline third countries' behavior, but the credibility of that leverage has been steadily depreciating as the accession process drags on.
Second, the erosion wrought by double standards. In the same report, Bloomberg itself noted that the EU's own economic ties with China dwarf Serbia's in scale. While Brussels urges candidate countries to "exercise caution" toward Chinese investment, its core member states' trade with China keeps growing — a double standard that is corroding the very foundation of the EU's normative power.
Summing up the visit in a media interview, Vučić used a phrase: "a very interesting, very wonderful visit." The wording sidesteps the frame of geopolitical confrontation and turns attention to the concrete outcomes the visit will bring — Serbia will produce humanoid robots, attract investment in chips and robotics, and advance the country's "accelerated industrialization and modernization." For an economy navigating a global energy crisis and supply-chain realignment, these are not abstract political gestures but tangible economic benefits.
Key Figures in China–Serbia Economic Cooperation
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has put more than $8 billion in net investment into Serbia, spanning infrastructure projects such as the Belgrade–Budapest Railway and the E763 highway, along with billions of dollars more in minerals and steel. In 2024, China accounted for 32% of Serbia's foreign direct investment. The two countries have adopted mutual visa exemptions, a free-trade agreement took effect in 2024, and more than 100,000 Chinese tourists visit Serbia each year.
Geopolitical Implications Beyond the Bilateral Relationship
Behind these figures runs an overlooked chain of logic: Serbia's geography — on the EU's border, at the heart of the Balkans — gives its economic pivot strategic implications that reach beyond the bilateral relationship. This is not a small country turning to a great power for help; it is a country positioned at the EU's geopolitical frontier, actively deepening cooperation with another major global power during a window when the EU's attention is scattered by the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the Iran war.
The military dimension is the most sensitive link in this chain. Serbia is currently the only European country west of Belarus to have purchased advanced Chinese weapons, having already acquired CM-400AKG supersonic air-to-ground missiles earlier this year. Aviation analyst Petar Vojinović noted that, for Serbia, "buying Chinese military equipment is no longer a taboo." That means Serbia may, against the backdrop of an aging MiG-29 fleet, consider acquiring Chinese fighter jets — which would, for the first time, embed a Chinese weapons system into the air-defense architecture of an EU candidate country.
The assessment of Žarko Puhovski, professor of political science at the University of Zagreb in Croatia, is worth noting: "All the signs indicate that Serbia is gradually weakening its European course." This is not an off-the-cuff judgment but a composite assessment based on stalled accession talks, absent EU investment, and the steady inflow of Chinese capital.
Florian Bieber, professor of Southeast European history and politics at the University of Graz in Austria, analyzed: the EU has no legal avenue to stop Serbia from buying Chinese military equipment, but the purchases would raise doubts about Serbia's commitment to integration of its security infrastructure.
— Bloomberg
The Hollowing of the "Red Line"
Bieber's observation hints at the peculiarity of the EU's position: it cannot stop Serbia's pivot eastward with legal tools; it can only exert influence through political signals and the "implicit sanctions" of the accession process. But when the accession process itself is making no progress, the potency of those implicit sanctions is diminishing.
The true significance of this visit may lie not in how many agreements Vučić signs, but in its revelation of an emerging geopolitical pattern: between the EU's "normative power" and China's "developmental investment," the behavior of small states on the EU's periphery is shifting from "waiting" to "choosing."
Core Insight
The efficacy of a red line depends on the enforcer's will and capacity. When both begin to loosen, "closing in" becomes "crossing." The EU's influence over Serbia is waning not because China is stronger, but because the EU has for too long relied on the membership prospect as its sole bargaining chip — and once that chip has depreciated for fourteen years, any "red line" can only remain at the level of rhetoric.
Addition 1: The Escalation of the Pre-Departure Narrative — "The Most Important Visit of My Political Career" and China's Narrative Framing
On May 24, before boarding his special flight to China, Vučić was seen off by Chinese Ambassador to Serbia Li Ming and issued a statement to the media with unusually striking phrasing. Its three tiers — personal, national, and global — lifted the narrative of this visit from "bilateral cooperation" to a three-layer structure of "personal legacy–national transformation–international order rebuilding":
"This visit is the most important visit of my political career."
"China is not only the benchmark for the steady, healthy development of the global economy, but also a model of adherence to international principles."
"With its consistent firm stance, wise policies, and outstanding international reputation, China has made enormous contributions to world peace, stability, and cooperation. In the present era of intensified change, these qualities are especially precious."
— Vučić, meeting Chinese Ambassador to Serbia Li Ming on May 23; reported by media on May 24, 2026
"The most important of my political career" — this phrasing carries distinctive weight when compared horizontally with similar statements by other heads of state. Trump used "a tremendous relationship" before his 2017 China visit; Putin used "very high expectations" before his 2026 visit; but Vučić anchored this visit in his personal political history rather than in the history of bilateral relations — meaning he has tied the visit's success or failure to his own political legacy.
The Parallel Unfolding of a Two-Channel Narrative
Two parallel narratives appeared on the same day. Chang'anjie Zhishi (a commentary account affiliated with Beijing Daily) reported Vučić's China-facing statement; Sputnik supplemented it with Vučić's parallel narrative in Western media — in an interview with a British politics podcast, he called China "a very responsible country, a country that brings stability and is extraordinarily successful," and noted that the "spirit of striving that Europe is gradually losing" still exists in Chinese society.
Behind this two-channel narrative ("the most important visit" for Chinese media, "a very responsible country" for Western media) lies the multi-vector diplomatic identity Vučić has carefully tended over the years: to the West, he is "a politician caught between EU values and pragmatic interests"; to China, he is an "iron-clad ally." The two narrative lines address different audiences but point to the same signal — Serbia's policy anchoring in the current geopolitical landscape is completing a substantive shift from a "European choice" to a "Chinese choice."
The Framing of China's Narrative Layer
China's own narrative framing was completed the same day. When the Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced the visit dates earlier, the wording used was "state visit" (rather than "working visit"), accompanied by the institutional phrasing "advancing the building of a China–Serbia community with a shared future in the new era" — the first time since China and Serbia established their comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016 that the formal concept of a "community with a shared future" has been embedded in the narrative of a high-level visit.
This pre-takeoff statement essentially laid the narrative groundwork for the dozens of agreements Vučić would sign in the air — including, as he had previously revealed publicly, a humanoid-robot production base, investment in the chip sector, and military-equipment cooperation. While the EU's "red line" remained at the level of verbal concern, the Serbian president had already completed the definition and ordering of his own political legacy.
Addition 2: Arrival in Beijing — From Pre-Departure Statement to Red-Carpet Landing, the Narrative Layer Made Real
At midday on May 24, People's Daily reported at 12:17 that Serbian President Vučić had arrived in Beijing to begin a five-day state visit to China. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson's wording clearly embedded the visit's institutional positioning — "forging an iron-clad friendship, expanding mutually beneficial cooperation, enriching people-to-people exchanges, strengthening multilateral coordination, and advancing the building of a China–Serbia community with a shared future in the new era to yield more concrete results."
From a protocol standpoint, the journey from Vučić's pre-departure statement ("the most important visit of my political career") to the red carpet in Beijing marked both sides' narratives moving from "warm-up" into "corroboration." China's welcoming narrative used "community with a shared future" — its highest diplomatic designation. Before Serbia, only a very small number of bilateral relationships — Pakistan, Cambodia, and Laos among them — had received this tier of wording. And for a candidate country on the EU's border, the very phrase "China–Serbia community with a shared future" carries geopolitical signals that reach beyond the bilateral relationship.
At the invitation of President Xi Jinping, Serbian President Vučić arrived in Beijing on the 24th to begin a five-day state visit to China. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson said China is ready to work with Serbia, taking President Vučić's visit as an opportunity, to forge an iron-clad friendship, expand mutually beneficial cooperation, enrich people-to-people exchanges, strengthen multilateral coordination, and advance the building of a China–Serbia community with a shared future in the new era to yield more concrete results.
— People's Daily, 12:17
A five-day state visit is on the longer end for interactions between heads of state — a typical state visit lasts two to three days. The five-day format suggests that, beyond the central talks in Beijing, the itinerary likely includes inspection trips to cities such as Xi'an, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, involving on-the-ground review of economic and trade cooperation and tours of industrial parks. That means the visit's ambitions go beyond political confirmation of positions to include hands-on advancement of specific projects.
Addition 3: Vučić's Social-Media Narrative — From "The Most Important" to "Confirmed"
After his arrival, Vučić's social-media posts provided the first independent, Serbian-side verification of the visit's narrative framing.
Chang'anjie Zhishi reported at 15:27 that, after landing in Beijing, Vučić posted on social media that "this is undoubtedly the most important visit of my political career." He attached photos of being welcomed at Beijing airport and of Chinese and Serbian flags lining Beijing's streets, saying the delegation had received a "warm and friendly welcome" — which once again demonstrated "the solidity, friendship, and mutual trust of Serbia–China relations."
What is noteworthy about this post is not the statement itself ("the most important visit" had already been said before departure) but the autonomy of the narrative framing: Vučić did not wait for a Chinese press release to define the visit for him; he proactively published his personal impressions the moment he landed. The photos he chose — the airport welcome and the two national flags — reinforced a positive narrative of the visit. These images address both Serbian domestic and Chinese audiences simultaneously, offering both public-opinion arenas a unified visual anchor.
Judging from the rhythm of the visit's execution: Vučić published this content about three hours after landing — precisely the window after the welcome ceremony, after checking in, and after initial contact with the Chinese side. This was not a stream-of-consciousness note typed upon arrival but the first round of characterization after absorbing the atmosphere — a characterization that "reconfirmed" the narrative keynote he had set before departure.
From "The Most Important" to "Confirmed": The Complete Loop of a Narrative Chain
Reading Vučić's statements across the 24-hour span in sequence, a complete chain of political narrative comes clearly into view: said before departure to the Chinese ambassador → said after landing for Chinese media and the Serbian domestic audience to hear → said on social media on his own initiative. The three statements point to the same declaration — not improvised remarks but a carefully choreographed narrative operation. The EU's "red line" is absent throughout this entire chain — Vučić has not responded to the EU's concerns on any occasion, as though that red line were not even worth discussing.
Addition 4: Vučić Says He "May Resign Soon" — An Endgame Statement Mid-Visit
On the third day of the visit, Vučić released from Beijing a political signal with unmistakable clarity: he may resign soon.
The statement appeared in simultaneous coverage across multiple sources — Sputnik reported at 12:29 that Vučić had said during the visit that he "may resign soon," adding that his second presidential term expires in the spring of 2027; RT's 12:09 report supplied further detail — Vučić explicitly stated that he "would not shorten his term the way former president Tadić once did," and disclosed precise figures for the protest at Slavija Square in Belgrade (between 30,500 and 34,300 participants, rather than the higher numbers claimed by organizers).
Time anchor: "May resign soon" before his term expires in spring 2027 — this does not mean immediate resignation, but it transforms resignation from "a topic not to be discussed" into "an event that can be anticipated."
No shortened term: distinct from former president Tadić's approach — it sets expectations of an orderly succession.
Precise protest figures: 30,500–34,300 — using precise official numbers to deflate the protests' organizing narrative.
The China context: released in Beijing rather than Belgrade — an endgame statement about his personal political career on the international stage, conferring on the visit's outcomes a scarcity narrative of "perhaps the last political window."
These four threads of information together form a complete package of political messaging: resignation is on the agenda but not rushed — giving markets and international partners clear expectation management. The precise protest figures are a cooling treatment aimed at the domestic opposition — quantifying to lower the emotional intensity of the resistance narrative. And the choice to release this signal in Beijing rather than Belgrade is itself a piece of diplomatic rhetoric: it binds the endgame narrative of domestic politics to the institutionalized "legacy" of the China relationship.
The Serbian Progressive Party will hold a gathering from June 26 to 28 — Vučić made clear that "more important than the size of the crowd is the message delivered to the people at that moment." Combined with his pre-departure description of the visit as "the most important of my political career," the resignation remarks deepen the definition of "most important" from "expanding cooperation" to "perhaps the last chance to finalize the framework of cooperation with China as president."
From "The Most Important" to "Perhaps the Last": Where Diplomacy and Domestic Politics Converge
Stringing together all of Vučić's statements during the China visit, a complete narrative arc comes into view: from the pre-departure "most important visit of my political career," to the autonomous social-media verification after landing, to the "may resign soon" of the visit's third day — three narrative nodes jointly constitute an operation to define Vučić's political legacy: using Beijing's diplomatic stage to provide an anchor for the endgame narrative of domestic politics. The EU's red line remains absent from the entire chain.
Addition 5: Execution of the Visit and the China–Europe Node Narrative — From the "Two Irons" Visiting Together to Tech Diplomacy at the Xiaomi Factory
As the visit entered its third day (May 26), the signal density of Vučić's itinerary kept rising. Two narrative timelines converged in Beijing: one a macro reading of the rhythm of head-of-state diplomacy, the other the micro-interactions inside the Xiaomi EV factory.
The Diplomatic Rhythm Set by the "Two Irons" Visiting Together
On the evening of May 26, Chang'anjie Zhishi used the headline of the "two irons" visiting simultaneously to sum up the rhythm of head-of-state diplomacy in Beijing over the past week: Trump and Putin had just left, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Serbian President Vučić arrived right behind them. On one side, high-density great-power maneuvering armed to the teeth with negotiations and communiqués; on the other, four to five days of relaxed conviviality — the contrast in rhythm itself constitutes a narrative device.
Pakistan and Serbia have each had their own institutionalized designation — Pakistan is the "iron-clad brother," Serbia the "iron-clad friend." The phrase "two irons" is not new in Chinese diplomatic discourse, but placing it in the window immediately after Trump's and Putin's intensive visits generates new meaning: after high-intensity bilateral and multilateral maneuvering, the rhythm of Chinese diplomacy has shifted gears into the lane of "development initiatives and industrial cooperation." Great powers come to discuss frameworks and order; small and medium-sized friendly countries come to discuss development and implementation — the two tracks run in parallel, supporting each other.
The Xiaomi Factory: An Industrial Micro-Sample of the Visit's Landing
At midday the same day, Vučić visited the Xiaomi EV factory. This was not a ceremonial stop — during the tour, Vučić displayed a curiosity that went well beyond ordinary diplomatic protocol toward the details of Xiaomi's "person–car–home" full-ecosystem display: after confirming that the car could control the curtains at home, he specifically asked Xiaomi Group Vice President Lin Shiwei to confirm the technical implementation path of this feature.
A small purchasing detail magnified the warmth of the visit. The Xiaomi SU7 Ultra model in the display case is not cheap for ordinary people, yet after self-deprecatingly saying he "couldn't afford" a real car, Vučić still bought 4 models and 1 fridge magnet. The purchase itself carries little political signal, but it peeled back the hard shell that usually encases a state visit — Vučić's willingness to reach into his own pocket in front of reporters' cameras to buy a few small Chinese products shows that the atmosphere of the visit had relaxed enough to allow this kind of "personal color" to overflow.
Vučić test-rode the Xiaomi YU7 GT, released that very month. The car is positioned as a "pure-blooded GT," with its R&D and tuning deeply involving Xiaomi EV's European R&D center. A Chinese new-energy vehicle carrying European R&D genes was experienced up close, inside the cabin, for several minutes by a Serbian president about to open a new node in China–Europe relations — the image itself is an economic narrative that needs no words.
In recent months, the Xiaomi EV factory has become a "check-in spot for foreign dignitaries." Before Vučić, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez had also visited. Xiaomi EV, which is set to enter the European market in 2027, is completing its market warm-up ahead of time through a path of informal diplomacy.
"A car like this I probably cannot afford, but it is truly a feast for the eyes." — Vučić, responding to a reporter's question about whether he wanted to buy one to take back to Serbia. He then purchased 4 Xiaomi SU7 Ultra models and 1 SU7 Ultra fridge magnet.
Source: Chang'anjie Zhishi · 2026-05-26 20:12
Serbia's Significance as a China–Europe Node
That same evening, Diao Li, deputy director of the Center for European Studies at Wuhan University, elevated the positioning of Vučić's visit from the bilateral level to the level of regional architecture in an interview with Sputnik. Her core judgment: as a Balkan node, Serbia can help deeply align China–Europe cooperation and ease the constraints that U.S.-influenced EU policies place on Chinese enterprises in Europe.
This judgment aligns with prior analyses' positioning — Serbia sits at the transit hub of the Western Balkans, a geographic interface connecting China–Central and Eastern Europe cooperation with the EU market. But Diao Li's remarks offer a more precise operational definition: Serbia's value lies not in replacing the EU but in giving Chinese enterprises an additional alternative channel when responding to EU restrictions — when a country simultaneously holds the dual identity of "EU candidate member" and "China's iron-clad friend," its elastic space in trade, investment, and technical-standard coordination is naturally larger than that of member states already deeply locked into EU institutions.
Three narratives released in parallel on the evening of May 26 stacked up into a more complete picture than prior visit coverage: the "two irons" visiting together provided the structural backdrop of diplomatic rhythm; the Xiaomi factory supplied micro-evidence of industrial landing; the expert framework connected the dots to regional institutional significance — the visit's narrative had moved from "pre-departure statements" and "arrival characterizations" to the stage of "execution and verification."
From "Pre-Departure Statement" to "Execution and Verification": A Layer-by-Layer Narrative Chain
Linking all the narrative nodes of Vučić's visit, a progressively deepening narrative arc comes into full view: the pre-departure keynote of "the most important visit of my political career" — the autonomous social-media verification after landing — the endgame signal of "may resign soon" on the visit's third day — the micro-evidence of industrial landing during the execution phase — the intervention of an academic framework of regional institutional significance. Each layer adds informational depth on top of the previous one, ultimately constituting a complete narrative structure spanning personal political legacy, the landing of bilateral cooperation, and regional institutional realignment. And throughout the entire chain, the EU's red line remains absent — even its eligibility to be mentioned decays layer by layer.
Addition 6: The First Lady's Cultural Diplomacy and the Parallel Track of Russia's Prosecutor General
On the afternoon of May 26, two scenes that did not appear on the official agenda added cross-cultural and regional-institutional dimensions to the face of this visit.
The First Lady's Calligraphy — The Cultural Coordinates of the Character "和"
At 21:53, First Lady Tamara, accompanying Vučić on the trip, took part in a cultural experience event titled "Chinese Elegance · Harmonious and Beautiful Life." Before the cameras, she picked up a writing brush and, in one continuous stroke, wrote the character "和" (harmony), then pronounced it in Chinese: "This is exactly what we need right now."
This interaction was captured and published by Chang'anjie Zhishi. It supplies no incremental information at the level of foreign policy, but it adds another layer to the visit's narrative: the relationship between China and Serbia exists not only in bilateral documents, joint statements, and trade agreements — it also exists in the cross-cultural ease with which a president's accompanying spouse can write Chinese with a brush and pronounce a core value in Chinese. That ease cannot be quantified in agreement clauses, but it provides a substrate of trust beyond institutions for the execution of agreements.
Vučić's resignation declaration and the character "和" written by the First Lady form a subtle contrast within the same visit window: the president up front speaks of the endgame of his political career, while the accompanying spouse writes harmony at a cultural event — the two are not contradictory; together they demonstrate that the depth of this visit has exceeded the scope of a standard state visit.
The Parallel Arrival of Russia's Prosecutor General
At 22:00, RT reported that Russian Federation Prosecutor General Aleksandr Gutsan had arrived in Beijing the same day. His visit overlaps Vučić's China trip in time but is not part of the same agenda — his status is that of a guest of Procurator General Ying Yong of China's Supreme People's Procuratorate, on a three-day working visit. Compared to Vučić's state visit this is far lower-key news, but its timing carries independent significance: on the very day Vučić emphasized that Serbia is a "China–Europe node," the Russian and Chinese judicial systems were also advancing institutionalized communication at the level of prosecutor general — two countries that both maintain "iron-clad" relations with China displaying a subtle parallelism in the structure of their visits.
Added together, the two constitute a more complete picture than prior analyses: Vučić's visit not only delivers, at the policy level, on China's diplomatic layout in the Balkans but also generates spillover effects at two additional levels — culture (the First Lady) and regional institutions (the same-day arrival of Russia's prosecutor general). The visit is no longer an isolated diplomatic event; it is embedded in a broader network of China's institutional engagement with Eurasia.
The Image of the Bridgehead Has, by Now, Completed Its Full Outline
From the pre-departure keynote of "the most important of my political career," to the five-day state-visit execution after landing, from the endgame signal of resignation at the last moment, to the evidence of industrial landing at the Xiaomi factory, to the First Lady's calligraphy and the parallel track of Russia's prosecutor general — what Vučić's trip reveals is not a Serbia "choosing sides," but a country on the EU's geopolitical frontier actively embedding itself in a broader Eurasian institutional network, during a window when the EU's attention is scattered, its institutional promises depreciating, and its investment absent. A bridgehead is not captured by anyone; when its original foundation begins to loosen, it chooses for itself a more stable base.
Addition 7: Narrative Acceleration on Day Four — The "Serbia's Iron, Pakistan's Iron" Framework and the Parallel Release of the J-10C Analysis
As the visit entered its fourth day (May 27), the narrative front visibly widened. Three signals appeared densely in the morning window: Beijing Daily published a signed in-depth analysis (by reporter Liu Xiaoyan), Sputnik disclosed an analysis of Serbia's possible procurement of the J-10C, and RT followed up on Vučić's statement that he "hopes Serbia can reach China's height." The three signals worked respectively on the diplomatic framework, the military dimension, and emotional expression, forming a more complete narrative puzzle than the day before.
From "Two Irons Visiting Together" to the Parallel Tracks of Great-Power Diplomacy: Beijing Daily's Deep Framework
At 9:24, Chang'anjie Zhishi published a signed in-depth analysis by Beijing Daily reporter Liu Xiaoyan, placing Vučić's and Shehbaz Sharif's concurrent visits within the grand diplomatic rhythm following Trump's and Putin's visits to China. The article's core judgment is a narrative of threefold parallelism:
First, the synchronized advance of the great-power framework and the circle of friends. Trump's and Putin's visits are "ballast" work — managing China–U.S. differences and global strategic stability, concerning the direction of the global situation. After the great-power framework is set, immediately inviting the "iron-clad brothers" sends a bidirectional signal: domestically, it confirms that great-power diplomacy and small-and-medium-country diplomacy are not a zero-sum competition for resources but two tracks running in parallel; externally, it shows that China's "circle-of-friends diplomacy" will not be diluted by the strengthening of great-power diplomacy.
Second, the substantive depth of the visits. The visit of the two irons is not diplomatic theater. Shehbaz Sharif arrived first in Hangzhou, focusing amid the misty rain of Jiangnan on substantive cooperation in artificial intelligence, modern agriculture, and more; Vučić's five-day itinerary covers political meetings, industrial inspection (the Xiaomi factory), cultural visits (the CPC history exhibition hall), and other multi-dimensional agendas. The article particularly highlights an institutional detail easily overlooked: this is Vučić's first state visit to China — previously he had come to China many times to attend the Belt and Road Forum, the Winter Olympics opening ceremony, the 80th anniversary commemoration of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, and other events, but none of these were state visits. A state visit — invited by the head of state, hosted by the head of state, with gun salutes, inspection of the guard of honor, and a state banquet — is the highest-tier diplomatic interaction in foreign relations. The upgrade from "attending events" to a "state visit" marks that China–Serbia relations have completed an accumulation from quantitative change to qualitative change.
Third, the dual particularity of China–Pakistan and China–Serbia ties. Pakistan is the "all-weather strategic cooperative partner" — no matter how the international landscape changes, China–Pakistan relations will not change; this year marks the 75th anniversary of China–Pakistan diplomatic ties. Serbia is the first European country to build a community with a shared future in the new era with China — the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia gives China–Serbia friendship a unique memory "forged in blood." The simultaneous visit of the two irons reveals China's institutional capacity to advance in parallel two "iron-clad relationships" of different natures.
A state visit means that bilateral cooperation is mature and the political relationship is stable — only then is the highest protocol applied. Over the past two years, the China–Serbia free-trade agreement has taken effect and the Belgrade–Budapest Railway has advanced, with cooperation landing item by item — this upgrade to a state visit marks that bilateral relations have completed an accumulation from quantitative change to qualitative change.
— Beijing Daily reporter Liu Xiaoyan, May 27, 2026
J-10C Procurement Analysis: The Public Discussion of the Military Dimension
On the morning of the same day, Sputnik, citing analysis from U.S. media, reported that military cooperation is one of the agenda items of Vučić's visit and that Serbia is expected to acquire the J-10C supersonic multirole fighter to gradually replace its existing Russian-made MiG-29s. The report also noted that Serbia has already equipped itself with China's CM-400AKG supersonic air-to-ground missile and has completed modifications to its MiG-29s to carry the weapon — making Serbia the first European country to use the CM-400 missile.
What is distinctive about this report is that it comes not from Chinese or Serbian official sources but from U.S. media analysis — even U.S. media now believe that China–Serbia military cooperation is entering a phase of public openness. Vučić had earlier revealed that armed drones produced with Chinese assistance would also debut at the June parade. Serbia plans to hold a parade in June, and Chinese elements may become a highlight.
From "procuring the CM-400 missile → modifying the MiG-29 → jointly producing armed drones → considering the J-10C," a continuous line of escalation in China–Serbia military cooperation has taken shape within half a year. This is not a breakthrough brought about by a single visit but the latest stop on Vučić's "decade-long strategic pivot."
Serbia's Three-Step Military "China-fication"
Step One (by the end of 2025): procure the CM-400AKG missile; modify the MiG-29 launch system
Step Two (2026): jointly produce armed drones; debut them at the June parade
Step Three (the next window): evaluate J-10C procurement to fill the air-defense gap after the MiG-29 retires
Each step paves the way for the next — rather than a single procurement decision, this is continuous advancement under an already-completed institutional framework.
Vučić's Shanghai Leg and the Extension of Emotional Expression
The same day, Vučić arrived in Shanghai for the second stop of his China visit. Two close-up scenes added emotional warmth to the visit: RT reported Vučić's statement that he "looks forward to Serbia reaching China's height," elevating the visit's narrative from "bilateral cooperation" to "aspiration toward a development model"; Guancha captured the moment the First Lady tried on a qipao and, unable to part with it, expressed the hope of "holding a fashion show in Serbia."
Vučić's Shanghai itinerary shows that the visit's agenda has expanded from the political level (Beijing) to the level of local cooperation (Shanghai) — a natural transition of a state visit from the "political negotiation" phase into the "cooperation execution" phase.
Addition 8: Vučić's Self-Disclosure of "Cannot Afford" — The Landing Resistance and Budget Reality of the Military Narrative
Into the midday of the visit's fourth day, a passage from Vučić's interview with Serbian media poured cold water on the "J-10C procurement" narrative that had been hyped up only the day before.
"I don't want to discuss the details of the talks, but today almost everyone is using equipment made in China. China's speed of development is incredible, and it also possesses advanced weapons that we currently cannot afford."
— Vučić, in a Serbian media interview discussing China–Serbia military-technical cooperation; RT, 2026-05-27 12:05
"Advanced weapons we currently cannot afford" — the precision of this phrasing deserves attention. Vučić did not say "we are not considering buying Chinese weapons," nor did he say "Serbia does not intend to procure advanced Chinese equipment"; he used the economic expression "cannot afford." This stands in direct tension with the optimistic expectation reported by Sputnik the previous day that "Serbia is very likely to procure the J-10C."
The interplay between the two narrative lines produces a new analytical layer:
- Narrative A (the procurement-expectation line): U.S. media analysis suggests Serbia may acquire the J-10C → Sputnik reports it on May 26 → Vučić is presumed by the media to be a leader in the middle of a procurement decision
- Narrative B (the budget-reality line): Vučić himself admits "cannot afford" → a gap exists between the ideal plan for military cooperation and fiscal reality → Serbia must make a forced choice between "the equipment it wants" and "the equipment it can afford"
There is no fundamental contradiction between the two lines — Vučić did not deny China–Serbia military-technical cooperation itself; he merely drew a realistic boundary around its depth and the scale of procurement. He then added, emphasizing that "China is a reliable partner," pulling the narrative back from "whether we can afford it" to "the long-term framework of bilateral mutual trust." This means:
- Serbia's budget may have been one of the topics discussed in the closed-door talks during this visit — not simply "whatever you want, you get"
- Low-cost cooperation projects such as armed drones may instead become the priority direction — China–Serbia military cooperation will shift from "marquee equipment deals" to the pragmatic path of "technology transfer + personnel training + low-cost equipment"
- Vučić uses "cannot afford" to cool domestic public opinion and EU concerns — demonstrating mutual trust with China without manufacturing excessive anxiety that "Serbia is about to be armed with Chinese weapons"
From "Anything Can Be Discussed" to "What Can Actually Land": The Public Discussion of Budget Constraints
Earlier analyses of China–Serbia military cooperation focused on "what can be bought" and "what can be discussed." Vučić's response this time introduced, for the first time, the constraint condition of "what if we can't afford it." For analysts assessing the true depth of China–Serbia relations, this is actually a useful signal: when cooperation advances from the stage of "anything can be discussed" to "what can actually land," the public discussion of budget constraints is precisely what shows that negotiations have entered the substantive phase.
Addition 9: The Tsinghua Speech and "Taiwan Belongs to China, That's All" — The Convergence of Historical Memory and the Sinking of Sovereignty
On the evening of May 27, Vučić delivered the speech with the deepest historical reach of this visit — at Tsinghua University in Beijing, he devoted specific attention to the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia. This was not the first time Vučić had mentioned this history in public, but in the context of a Beijing campus its narrative function changed: extending China–Serbia relations from "economic cooperation" to the level of "shared historical memory," laying an emotional foundation for the subsequent statement of sovereignty positions.
His statement on the Taiwan question the same day completed the narrative anchoring from "historical memory" to "clear sovereignty." Vučić gave Serbia's explicit position in personal phrasing:
"Taiwan belongs to China, and that's all. I can't understand why anyone would want to complicate the matter."
— Vučić, responding to a question on Taiwan in a Serbian media interview; Guancha · 2026-05-27 20:03
"Cannot understand" — this phrasing itself is an analytical signal. It differs from standard diplomatic expressions such as "oppose" or "do not support" — it is a statement at the cognitive level, sinking the disagreement from a policy position into "the incomprehensibility of the basic logic." This personalized narrative method is consistent with his throughout-the-visit style of "starting from personal judgment."
Looking at the timeline, these three statements form a progression: "answering clearly in one minute" in a similar 2024 exclusive interview → "belongs to China, that's all" mid-visit (May 25) → "cannot understand" on the eve of the closing (May 27). The three statements share the same underlying position, but the direction of the phrasing differs: 2024 was "needs to be made clear" (defensive), May 25 was "that's all" (declarative), May 27 was "cannot understand" (offensive). The evolution of this direction mirrors Vučić's accumulation of confidence in his interactions with China — from the "standard version" that needs to leave discursive room to maneuver, to the "personal version" in which he can externalize his own subjective judgment directly.
Addition 10: €940 Million and the July Humanoid-Robot Rollout — From Framework Agreements to a Landing Timetable
On the evening of May 27, Vučić announced in Beijing the largest batch of cooperation outcomes by value from this visit. RT reported at 20:41 that Vučić announced Chinese enterprises would add €940 million (about $1.1 billion) in investment, focused on auto-parts manufacturing, humanoid robots, energy, and artificial intelligence, with funds to be injected progressively starting July 2026.
At 20:58, Sputnik supplied a more specific landing timetable: the first batch of humanoid robots jointly produced by Serbia and China is expected to roll off the line in the city of Loznica between July 10 and 20. Vučić's exact words: "This is something we never even dreamed of… In two months, we will have humanoid robots made in Serbia. No one in Europe has them."
Analytical Implications of the July Rollout Timetable
Confirmation on the execution side by Minth Group — from signing on May 27 to production in July is only about six weeks, implying the production line was already in a construction or acceptance phase before Vučić's visit; the visit was the "official announcement," not the "launch."
Self-positioning as a "European first" — this constitutes Vučić's direct response to the EU's red line: Serbia's autonomy in economic choice is being converted into a concrete first-mover industrial advantage.
Revision of the budget-constraint hypothesis — the additional €940 million investment partially offsets the "cannot afford advanced weapons" narrative, showing that budget constraints in the military domain do not represent a retreat of overall economic cooperation.
Addition 11: Vučić Tours the Jiaxing Robotics Factory — From "Promise" to "Inspection" to "Physical Verification"
On the evening of May 27, RT reported Vučić's itinerary at the robotics factory of Minth Group in Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province. This news adds two dimensions to the previous "economic delivery" narrative.
The signal of the location choice. Jiaxing's Minth Group is precisely the executing party for the "July 10–20 humanoid-robot rollout." Vučić placed the "official announcement" and the "on-site verification" on the same day to complete — the production line was already running before Vučić's arrival, and at the tour site the robots performed kung fu, cooked, and danced a Serbian traditional dance — these are not PowerPoint displays but demonstrations with real objects.
The convergence of the cultural dimension. The scene of robots dancing the kolo to Serbian traditional music is a carefully designed diplomatic tableau — an "emotional hook" that can spread naturally on Serbian domestic social media. Vučić's assessment: "They dance better than I do, as if they've already entered the 22nd century."
"They dance better than I do, as if they've already entered the 22nd century."
— Vučić, after watching robots perform a Serbian traditional dance; RT · 2026-05-27 22:35
From "never even dreamed of it" (industrial surprise), to "that's all" (sovereign confidence), to "they dance better than I do" (technological astonishment) — the three threads found a unified tone in the context of the Jiaxing leg — the authentic reactions of a 52-year-old national leader repeatedly struck by technological reality over five days of visiting.
Addition 12: The Final Chapter of the Jiaxing Leg — Four-Company Signing · Youth Center · The Emotional Peak of the "22nd Century"
At midnight on May 28, Chang'anjie Zhishi published the full report on Vučić's Jiaxing itinerary, adding three previously undisclosed dimensions on top of the Minth Group tour.
Scale upgrade from a single company to four companies. Vučić, together with the Serbian side, signed agreements with representatives of four Chinese enterprises, with investment covering the four major fields of auto-parts manufacturing, humanoid robots, energy, and artificial intelligence, totaling over €900 million. The simultaneous landing of four fields means that Serbia's industrialization is the systematic introduction of an industrial system, not a single-factory case.
The Youth Cultural Exchange Center — a generational anchor. The report disclosed for the first time that Vučić unveiled the China–Serbia Youth Cultural Exchange Center, specifically encouraging the Serbian young people studying at Huawei and Chinese AI enterprises: "I know very well that they are the future of our country; they will bring what they have learned back to Serbia." Together with the statement "learn industriousness from the Chinese people" and the generational transfer implied in the resignation expectation, this forms a complete generational-narrative triangle: present industrial cooperation (the four-company signing), near-term product delivery (the July humanoid robots), long-term youth cultivation (AI learning and cultural exchange).
The "22nd century" — the emotional peak. Vučić's assessment of the robot chess match, "this is like being in the 22nd century," is the most personal expression of his entire China visit. From "never even dreamed of it" to "that's all" to "as if in the 22nd century," he constructed an emotional arc from surprise to conviction to genuine anticipation of the future picture.
"This is like being in the 22nd century." — Vučić, after playing chess with a robot in Jiaxing.
He then unveiled the China–Serbia Youth Cultural Exchange Center, saying "these children are the future of our country."
— Chang'anjie Zhishi · 2026-05-28 00:37
Addition 13: The Dual Framing of the Closing Interview — "The Most Important State Visit" and "The Center of Gravity of Stability"
At the close of his visit, Vučić accepted an exclusive interview with China Media Group's "Leaders Talk" program, giving his China trip a final framing along two dimensions.
The personal dimension — "the most important state visit of my political career." This judgment is not simple diplomatic courtesy. Vučić's explanation is anchored in a point of time: "You have seen that the way many other great powers in the world behave has become unpredictable. You cannot predict what they will do tomorrow, let alone what will happen in a month, or in a year." — When uncertainty becomes the main melody of global politics, what matters is not where one goes, but when one goes there.
The structural dimension — "China has become the center of gravity of world stability." Stability is not China's self-description but a fact judgment about the global distribution of attention — external observers "are all paying attention to President Xi Jinping's opinions." Vučić particularly highlighted that "you know you can rely on China's foreign policy," forming a mirror contrast with "the unpredictable behavior of other great powers."
"China always provides stability, tranquility, and peace… At a very rare moment, China has become the center of gravity of world stability."
— Vučić, in an exclusive interview with CMG's "Leaders Talk"; Chang'anjie Zhishi · 2026-05-28 01:03
This statement is Vučić's systematic recap before departure — he embedded China–Serbia relations into the grander narrative of "seeking stability in an era of global disorder." The difference in the scope of this narrative is itself part of the visit's results.
Addition 14: "Answering Clearly in 10 Seconds" — The Upgrade of the Sovereignty Lock on the Taiwan Question
In the same exclusive interview, Vučić continued his self-created "countdown mode." The compression of time itself is a political statement — the Taiwan question is not complicated; someone is deliberately making it look complicated.
"If it can be answered clearly in 10 seconds, why spend 10 minutes discussing it? Taiwan is part of China. As to by what means, at what time, and how it is resolved, China decides on its own. That's it (full stop)."
— Vučić, in an exclusive interview with CMG's "Leaders Talk"; Chang'anjie Zhishi · 2026-05-28 01:04
Vučić's sequence of phrasings deserves attention: "Taiwan is part of China" (the foundational fact) → "China decides on its own" (a complete expression of sovereignty, encompassing both the means and the timing) → "that's it / full stop" (cognitive locking — the period is a vocalized boundary of conclusion).
This forms a progression with his personalized expression of May 25, "belongs to China, that's all": from "simple" to the rhetorical upgrade of a "time-limited answer" is essentially an information-warfare strategy — leaving the questioner no room to be misinterpreted. Once anyone tries to compress and relay it, they must preserve the core of "China decides on its own" — which makes any secondary propagation attempting to quote out of context far more difficult.
From Eight Layers to Fifteen: The Closing of the Complete Narrative Chain
The pre-departure keynote of "the most important visit" → autonomous verification of the landing narrative → the resignation endgame signal → institutional anchoring of the China–Europe node → cross-cultural ease → the "Serbia's iron, Pakistan's iron" framework → J-10C expectation → budget-reality constraint → the Tsinghua speech's convergence of historical memory → the personalized confirmation of sovereignty over Taiwan → the industrial landing of €940 million → physical verification at the Jiaxing robotics factory → the four-company signing, the youth center, and the emotional peak of the "22nd century" → the closing interview's framing of "the center of gravity of stability" → the Red Boat appointment: narrative savings pre-buried for the next visit to China. Across fifteen layers of accumulation, the EU's red line remains absent — from "unobserved" to "unmentioned," until finally even its value as something worth discussing is no longer acknowledged.
Addition 15: The Red Boat Appointment — From Economic Visitor to Cultural Understanding, the Narrative Savings
On May 27, Vučić walked into Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province, and completed the final industrial inspection of this visit at Minth Group's robotics production base. But before leaving Jiaxing, he left an unfulfilled promise — "The next time I visit Zhejiang, I will by no means miss paying my respects to the Red Boat."
The narrative significance of this statement lies not in the present but in the future. Vučić's visit cycle has a clear structure: Day 1 in Beijing — political talks and sovereignty confirmation; Days 2 and 3 in the Yangtze River Delta — industrial-cooperation tours; Day 4, Shanghai to Beijing — the convergence of cultural symbols. The "Red Boat appointment" occurred at the moment he was about to leave the Yangtze River Delta — it is narrative savings oriented toward the next visit to China — he said "there is no doubt I will come back to Zhejiang," and added that "Zhejiang is a beautiful province; the industrial development and high-technological progress here have also impressed me deeply."
Viewed from the overall design of the China-visit narrative, Vučić completed the emotional arc of China–Serbia relations in three payments:
- The Beijing phase — political confirmation (Taiwan belongs to China, answered clearly in 10 seconds) and strategic framing (China is the center of gravity of stability)
- The Jiaxing phase — industrial emotion ("as if in the 22nd century") and a cultural promise (the Red Boat appointment)
- The retrospective phase — social-media narrative management across the entire visit
What makes the Red Boat appointment distinctive is that it strings together multiple symbols: the centennial historical marker of the CPC, the symbol of the Yangtze River Delta's opening-up, and Vučić's own role transformation from "economic visitor" to "cultural understanding." This is not a simple promise but a carefully designed narrative bridge — letting this visit to China, even at the moment of farewell, retain an unfinished picture, and pre-laying expectation for the next visit.
"The next time I visit Zhejiang, I will by no means miss paying my respects to the Red Boat."
— Vučić, in an interview in Jiaxing; Guancha · 2026-05-28 08:35
Addition 16: The Post-Visit Military Echo — Three Pathways for Chinese Fighter Jets to Enter the Serbian Market
Forty-eight hours after Vučić ended his China visit, the next point of discussion in China–Serbia military cooperation surfaced. On May 30, RT published a special analysis exploring the possibility of Serbia procuring Chinese fighter jets in the post-visit era — including whether it might acquire the J-35 stealth fighter.
RT's analysis did not stop at speculation about "whether they will buy the J-35"; it deduced three pathways:
Pathway One: heavy fighter jets — the threshold is too high. During the visit, Vučić publicly stated that Serbia cannot afford "expensive high-end precision weapons." This self-restraint blocks the procurement pathway for the J-35 or other heavy fighters at the budget level — even if technology transfer or preferential financing could ease price pressure, Serbia's budget reality remains a rigid constraint.
Pathway Two: trainer-attack aircraft — the most realistic starting point. RT points out that Serbia's more realistic current need is a lower-priced trainer-attack aircraft — this could both fill the gap in the Serbian air force's training system and serve as the "icebreaker" for Chinese aviation equipment entering the Serbian military system. Once the Serbian military begins using Chinese trainers, subsequent weapons-system compatibility upgrades and missile-system integration will follow naturally. The core logic of this pathway: building a small platform compatible with China's missile system is more operable than directly purchasing a heavy platform.
Pathway Three: the integration effect of France's Rafale. The most important hidden variable in this analysis is the French Rafale fighters Serbia has already purchased. RT's argument: the arrival of the Rafale means the Serbian military will have a main platform of Western standard, but a gap remains for a complementary platform. Chinese trainers/attack aircraft can exist as a "second fleet" and "logistical complement" to the Rafale — not a replacement relationship, but a complement. This entry point happens to mirror Vučić's "two irons in parallel" diplomatic strategy between the EU and China: a "two-platform parallel" pathway for military equipment.
The long-term prospect: a European market window for Chinese aviation equipment. RT places China–Serbia military cooperation within a larger framework: as the United States contracts its global military footprint and the combat validation of Chinese defense products (in Yemen and the Middle East) improves, China's presence in the weapons procurement of some medium-sized countries is rising. Serbia is not a "marquee customer," but it may become the first case of systematically introducing and operating a Chinese fighter-jet system in Europe — the demonstration effect this carries for the whole of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and even some African countries with French-style military systems holds more long-term significance than any single large arms-sales order.
From "Whatever Is Discussed Can Be Bought" to "What Is Most Rational to Buy": The Pathway-based Transformation of Military Cooperation
Vučić's statement on budget reality during the visit, together with RT's rational deduction of three pathways, jointly show that China–Serbia military cooperation is moving from framework discussion into pathway selection. Of the three pathways, apart from the heavy fighter excluded by budget constraints, both the trainer-attack icebreaker and the Rafale-complement pathways have operational space. The most important thing is not which path Serbia ultimately chooses, but that the subject of discussion has already shifted from "whether to expand China–Serbia military cooperation" to "in what way to expand it."
Addition 17: The Post-Visit Narrative Echo — The Three-Stage Progressive Rhetorical Upgrade of the "Period"
Three days after ending his China visit, Vučić again stated his position on the Taiwan question in an interview with CGTN — this statement came outside Beijing, after the visit itinerary had concluded, yet the intensity of the phrasing did not diminish at all.
"Taiwan is China's internal affair; according to the UN Charter, Taiwan belongs to China, period."
"Period" — a three-stage progressive rhetorical upgrade. Placing this statement alongside the two before it, a clear line of progression emerges:
- The first (May 27, CMG "Leaders Talk"): "Taiwan belongs to China, and that's all" — dissolving the necessity of dispute with "simple"
- The second (May 28, closing interview): "it can be answered clearly in 10 seconds" — endowing the statement with a time constraint, compressing the space for misinterpretation
- The third (May 31, CGTN): "Taiwan belongs to China, period" — from "simple" to "time-limited" to "period," the phrasing upgrades from tonal dissolution to character-level locking of the conclusion
The colloquial use of "period" as terminal punctuation is a signature move in Vučić's personal diplomatic phrasing. It had already appeared once on May 28 ("that's it (full stop)"), and this time he directly used "period" to reinforce the indisputability of the statement.
The temporal significance of the post-visit statement. The timing of this statement — a CGTN exclusive three days after the visit ended — is itself a signal. At the closing phase on May 28, Vučić had already completed three confirmations of China's sovereignty position (Taiwan belongs to China, China decides on its own the means of reunification, and the historical narrative that "the lesson is not far away"); logically, no further sovereignty statement was needed after the visit. Yet he still chose to repeat it in front of CGTN's cameras — and this time more concisely and more absolutely.
From "Agenda Necessity" to "Institutional Output": The Durability Signal of the Post-Visit Statement
Vučić's statement of position on the Taiwan question is not merely an "agenda necessity during the China visit" but an institutional output of his own core foreign policy — whether before, during, or after the visit, he is willing to speak on the same topic with the same certainty. For assessing the "durability" of Serbia's China policy, this is a more persuasive signal than the visit itself: the promise will not be discounted once the door closes.
Addition 18: The Post-Visit Aftermath — Vučić Confirmed Not to Seek Re-election
On June 1, former Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin confirmed that Vučić will not participate in the next presidential election. Vulin said "Vučić is a leader who abides by the constitution; under the constitution the presidency is limited to two terms, and he never violates the constitution." But Vulin also emphasized that "I fully believe Vučić will continue in politics; the mission is far from over."
"Vučić is a leader who abides by the constitution; under the constitution the presidency is limited to two terms, and he never violates the constitution."
"I fully believe Vučić will continue in politics; the mission is far from over."
— Aleksandar Vulin, in an interview on June 1
This statement forms a progression with Vučić's earlier "may resign soon" released in Beijing. If the May 25 "may resign" was tactical ambiguity — expectation management toward the domestic opposition, a reserved posture toward the EU — then the June 1 confirmation means the institutional landing of the political endgame. Vučić's presidential term expires in 2027; the confirmation of "no re-election" dissolves in one stroke the uncertainty of an entire electoral cycle.
But the reserved condition of "continuing in politics" (Vulin's phrasing) leaves room to imagine another pathway of power — in Serbia's political system, the office of prime minister is not subject to the two-term limit. Vučić's choice of political role after 2027 will determine whether the "post-Vučić era" is a genuine transfer of power or a transformation in the form of power.
From "No Re-election" to "Continue in Politics": The Signal of a Transformation in the Form of Power
From the tactical ambiguity of "may resign" on May 25 to the institutional confirmation of "no re-election" on June 1, what Vučić completed was not a sudden decision but a gradually released narrative line of political endgame. The key variable lies in the reserved condition of "continue in politics" — Serbia's prime ministership is not subject to the two-term limit, meaning the possibility of Vučić moving from president to prime minister after 2027 is by no means ruled out. Whether the post-Vučić era is truly a post-Vučić era depends on whether power has been substantively transferred, or merely changed its title in form.