The historical trajectory of the Visegrád Group reveals a "life-cycle paradox" of sub-regional cooperation: after its founding objective (EU accession) was accomplished, the group did not dissolve — instead, it evolved new functions. But those new functions depended on the continuity of a political consensus among the member states; once that consensus disintegrated, the group's cohesion faded just as rapidly. The rise and fall of the V4 offers a fresh vantage point for understanding the power structure inside the EU and the geopolitical contest in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Visegrád Group (V4) is a sub-regional cooperation mechanism comprising Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia. In the three-plus decades since its founding, it has transformed from a "springboard into Europe" into a coordination tool inside the EU — and since the Russia-Ukraine war, its deep internal fractures have been laid bare. With Viktor Orbán's fall from power in 2026, the political configuration within the V4 is being reconstituted. As a case study, it offers a rare analytical window into the life cycle and structural fragility of European sub-regional cooperation.
What the Visegrád Group Is
The Visegrád Group (V4) is a cultural and political alliance of four countries: Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia. Its name comes from the 1991 meeting of the four countries' leaders at Visegrád Castle in Hungary — the same castle where, in the 14th century, the monarchs of the four realms once convened, lending the name a deep historical resonance.
After the upheavals of 1989–1991, the four countries urgently needed to coordinate their positions to meet the challenges of transition and to prepare for accession to the EU and NATO. The Visegrád Group was, in essence, a "goal-driven" cooperation mechanism — band together, and get into Europe.
From "Springboard into Europe" to Internal Fission
Founding and Expansion (1991–2004)
The group was originally founded by three countries: Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. When Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 — the "Velvet Divorce" — membership grew from three to four. That calm, orderly separation is itself a footnote to European political civilization: no upheaval, no referendum, conducted entirely through elite negotiation.
The EU Integration Years (2004–2014)
In 2004, all four countries joined the EU, and the group's founding objective naturally disappeared. Yet the V4 did not dissolve; instead, it transformed into a sub-regional tool for coordinating positions and amplifying collective voice inside the EU. During this period, the V4 was dubbed "the locomotive of European economic growth": between 1991 and 2019, the four countries' combined GDP grew by 150%, and their aggregate economy ranked 4th in the EU, 5th in Europe, and 15th in the world.
The Divergence Years (2015–present)
At a summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, the four countries unanimously opposed the European Commission's proposal to impose mandatory refugee quotas on member states. It was the first time the V4 formed a collective position inside the EU distinct from Western Europe's.
The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war became the V4's structural breaking point: Poland and the Czech Republic firmly supported Ukraine, their positions closely aligned with the EU and NATO; while Hungary (under Orbán) and Slovakia (under Fico) pursued a "peace policy," forming a kind of "anti-war alliance" inside the EU — in substance, opposition to continued military aid to Ukraine.
Organizational Architecture and Economic Weight
| Organizational Architecture | |
|---|---|
| Rotating presidency | Annual rotation (Poland held it from July 2024 to June 2025; Hungary from July 2025) |
| Leaders' summits | Convened ad hoc to discuss major issues |
| Ministerial meetings | Coordinate cooperation across specific policy areas |
| V4+ mechanism | Extended cooperation with other countries and regions |
In terms of voting weight in the Council of the European Union, the four V4 countries hold 58 votes combined (Poland 27 + Czech Republic 12 + Hungary 12 + Slovakia 7) — equal to the combined votes of France and Germany (29 + 29). This means that when the V4 forms a unified position inside the EU, its institutional weight cannot be underestimated.
Wang Jian, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, calls the V4 "the locomotive of European economic growth." GDP grew 150% from 1991 to 2019; by 2020, the group's aggregate economy ranked 4th in the EU and 15th in the world.
Division, Realignment, and the End of the Orbán Era
The Russia-Ukraine war tore the V4 into two camps — but an electoral earthquake in 2026 is changing everything.
Turnout in Hungary's parliamentary election reached nearly 80% — a record since democratization. Péter Magyar's Tisza Party won roughly 53% of the vote and 138 seats (more than a two-thirds majority), while Orbán's Fidesz took only 55. Orbán conceded defeat, ending 16 consecutive years in power that began in 2010.
The chain reactions of Orbán's exit are reshaping the political map of Central and Eastern Europe:
Hungary's Policy Pivot
After taking office, Magyar halted the procedure for Hungary's withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and declared that Hungary would "return to the West" as a "staunch ally" of the EU and NATO.
Russia Loses Its Microphone
Hungary had been Russia's most important political buffer inside the EU. Orbán's departure means Moscow has lost its key mouthpiece in the EU's core decision-making circles.
MAGA's European Export Stalls
Orbán sat on the same part of the political spectrum as Trump; his defeat means Trump's project of exporting MAGA to Europe has been forced onto pause.
The V4's Political Balance, Rebuilt
With Hungary no longer playing the outlier, the V4's internal equilibrium shifts from a "2:2 deadlock" to "3:1" — with the pro-European direction now dominant.
Forecast and Verification: The Guashu Diluola Video
In a video, Guashu Diluola (a video commentary channel) predicted that "Central and Eastern Europe will grow more pro-Russian, Western Europe more anti-Russian," and anticipated the emergence of a V4-like organization of "pragmatic anti-Russians." Measured against the actual course of events:
| Prediction | Verification |
|---|---|
| Central and Eastern Europe turns pro-Russian | Partially verified: Hungary and Slovakia did move closer to Russia after the war began |
| A "pragmatic anti-Russian" V4 revival emerges | Not fully realized: Orbán fell from power in April 2026, and Hungary's policy pivoted |
| Economic and trade cooperation with Russia continues | Partially verified: both countries maintain energy and trade ties with Russia, but long-term uncertainty is rising |
Hungary is one of China's friendliest partners in Europe. In 2024, China's direct investment in Hungary reached €7.6 billion — 58% of all foreign direct investment into the country — with major projects from CATL, BYD, and others. But the new government has said it will subject Chinese investment to a "comprehensive review," which could affect the existing pattern of cooperation.
The "Life-Cycle Paradox": The Rise and Fall of Sub-Regional Cooperation
The V4's trajectory yields a reusable analytical framework:
| Stage | Characteristics | Key Variables |
|---|---|---|
| Goal-driven stage | A shared external goal cements the cooperation (EU accession) | Goal clarity, external pressure |
| Functional transition stage | The founding goal disappears; new functions emerge (coordination inside the EU) | Internal consensus, attitude toward the EU |
| External shock stage | A major event exposes structural divisions (the Russia-Ukraine war) | Intensity of the shock, degree of divergence |
| Realignment / decline stage | Political upheaval in a key member catalyzes reconstruction | Domestic political change, external catalysts |
The core judgment of the "life-cycle paradox": a cooperation mechanism that successfully completes its founding objective survives afterward only if it can forge a new consensus that transcends that original goal. And when that new consensus depends on the political will of a few key leaders, the mechanism becomes extremely fragile — the electoral defeat of a single man can reshape the entire configuration.
Research Literature
The Visegrád Group (《维谢格拉德集团》)
Edited by Liu Zuokui and Wang Hongyi, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2023 — a key title in China's "14th Five-Year Plan" national publishing program.
The Transformation of Visegrád and China–V4 Cooperation (《维谢格拉德的嬗变与中国V4合作》)
Edited by Kong Tianping, China Social Sciences Press, 2015.
This essay draws on the following sources: the Guashu Diluola video analysis, reporting by the European Research Center of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, reporting by Yicai (China Business Network), analysis by the Central and Eastern Europe Research Center of Beijing Foreign Studies University, and research literature from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.