In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the legality of the global tariffs Donald Trump had imposed by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Four months later, tariff revenue has plunged from a monthly peak of more than $31.4 billion to a $25.6 billion loss in June — refunds now exceed new collections. Yet Trump has not given up. He is rebuilding the tariff wall at the maximum speed the law allows.
The 150-Day Window and the July 24 Countdown
The Court's ruling stripped Trump of IEEPA, his most flexible tariff tool. But he quickly found a substitute: invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, he imposed a 10 percent tariff on goods from around the world.
The catch is that Section 122 is valid for only 150 days. July 24 is the deadline.
Congress could extend these tariffs, but with the midterm elections approaching (November 3) and voters frustrated over the high cost of living, lawmakers are unlikely to vote for an extension. That means Trump must find a more durable legal foundation before July 24 — or watch a gap open up in his tariff wall.
July 24: the Section 122 tariffs expire
November 3: the midterm elections
The administration is racing to swap in Section 301 tariffs before the clock runs out.
The Return of Section 301
Trump's answer is a return to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 — the same provision he used to levy steep tariffs on China during his first term. Unlike IEEPA, Section 301 tariffs come with explicit rules on duration and renewal: they lapse after four years but can be renewed, and there is no ceiling on the rate.
Section 301, however, carries procedural requirements — an investigation, a public comment period, and hearings must all be completed. The Trump administration has already launched two sweeping Section 301 investigations:
The first accuses 60 countries — accounting for 99 percent of total U.S. imports — of failing to do enough to block imports of goods made with forced labor. Last month, U.S. Trade Representative Greer proposed tariffs on these countries: 10 percent for 16 of them and 12.5 percent for 44, on par with or slightly above the 10 percent Section 122 rate they are meant to replace. That proposal is still in the public-comment stage.
The second is examining whether 16 trading partners — including China, the European Union, and Japan — are guilty of industrial overcapacity and price suppression. Trade lawyers expect the administration to propose higher tariffs within one to two months, but with an effective date set after the midterms, "for the obvious reasons."
As recently as this Wednesday, Trump had already announced a 25 percent tariff on selected Brazilian imports, accusing the world's 11th-largest economy of unfair trade practices. Brazil's presidential office promptly rejected the measure and denied the unfair-trade allegations.
The Fragility of the Legal Foundation
Trade lawyers and former U.S. trade officials broadly agree that the administration will complete the swap to forced-labor tariffs before July 24, leaving "little or no gap" between the Section 122 and Section 301 regimes.
Whether the new Section 301 framework can survive in court, however, is a separate question.
Former U.S. trade official Sarah Bianchi puts the point especially sharply: Section 301 has always been fairly sturdy as a matter of law — but no one has ever tried to use it to "effectively impose universal tariffs." Converting an investigative tool designed for specific countries' trade practices into a blanket tariff covering 99 percent of global imports goes well beyond the original design of Section 301. Bianchi expects it to face legal challenges.
In other words, the road Trump is now traveling was not the one the law laid out for tariffs; it is being cut through a legal gray zone. How far it goes may, once again, come down to the Supreme Court drawing the line.
"They will build the tariff wall higher again."
The Cost of Uncertainty Itself
The article also reveals an easily overlooked dimension: uncertainty hurts businesses no less than the tariffs themselves.
Unable to foresee how trade rules will shift, companies are holding back on investment and decisions. From IEEPA to Section 122 to Section 301, every change of legal instrument reshuffles the rulebook. Compared with IEEPA tariffs, which could once be adjusted at will, Section 301 offers more procedural constraint — Bianchi describes it as "less uncertainty, but not a complete elimination." Uncertainty will not disappear; only its scale will change.
What businesses fear most is not high tariffs — it is not knowing what tomorrow's rate will be.