Pakistan's Red Line — From the Saudi–Houthi Exchange of Strikes to the Threat of a Bab el-Mandeb Blockade

Since the outbreak of the US–Iran war, Pakistan has played the role of mediator — shuttling between Tehran and Washington, relaying proposals and laying channels of communication. But when Saudi Arabia and the Houthi movement suddenly exchanged strikes on July 13, Islamabad found itself being dragged toward the very position it least wanted to occupy: being forced to choose a side.

In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual strategic defense pact stipulating that a third-party attack on either country would be treated as "an act of aggression against both." Born of the Gulf states' growing distrust of American security guarantees, the pact has now become a double-edged sword: it binds Pakistan to the obligation of defending Saudi Arabia, while also meaning that any Iranian retaliation could directly trigger a military confrontation with Pakistan.

A Red Line and an Outcome No One Wants to See

On July 16, Reuters, citing Pakistani officials, reported that the country's government and military leaders had conveyed a "red line" position to the highest levels in Iran: an attack on Saudi Arabia is an attack on Pakistan. This is no diplomatic flourish — Pakistani security analyst Muhammad Amir Rana admitted candidly that Islamabad had not expected tensions to "escalate so abruptly" to this degree.

The trigger came on July 13, when the Houthis — citing Saudi airstrikes on Sanaa International Airport — fired missiles and drones at Abha International Airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia. It was the most serious clash between the two sides since 2022. As of now the confrontation is still being treated as a "single incident," but the outside world's worry is clear: should full-scale fighting reignite between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, the fallout of the US–Iran conflict would spread from the Persian Gulf into the Red Sea.

The statement from Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson, Andrabi, was cautious and restrained — calling on all parties to exercise restraint and to resolve the matter through dialogue and diplomacy. But the anxiety behind the restraint is real: Pakistan is heavily dependent on oil and gas imports from the Middle East, and its domestic energy supply has already been affected by the US–Iran war.

The Bab el-Mandeb — The Other Shoe

If the "red line" declaration is Pakistan's defensive posture, then the signal Iran has sent through the Houthis is offensive. According to Reuters' July 16 report, Iran has told the Houthis that if the United States strikes Iran's power grid, the Houthis should blockade the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden — a chokepoint linking the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean, often called the "water corridor" joining Europe, Asia, and Africa. With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz already severely disrupted by the US–Iran war, a blockage of the Bab el-Mandeb as well would deal a double blow to global energy supplies.

Sources noted that closing the Bab el-Mandeb would "not be difficult" — disrupting shipping in those waters "does not even require sophisticated missiles." The Houthis have completed the relevant preparations, deploying missiles and drones near the strait.

Yanbu's Fourfold Surge

After Hormuz was disrupted, Saudi Arabia's national oil company, Saudi Aramco, activated an alternative route: using the East–West pipeline to move crude from the eastern producing regions to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, for export via the Bab el-Mandeb. Data from specialist trackers show that Yanbu's recent daily crude loading has approached its peak, reaching more than four times the level of the same period last year.

That figure reveals two facts. First, the alternative route is indeed working — pipeline capacity is being fully utilized. Second, the route depends entirely on the Bab el-Mandeb remaining open — the moment the strait is blockaded, Yanbu's capacity turns from a solution into an exposure point of risk.

For Pakistan, this means a more direct threat to energy security. As a country heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas imports, the disruption of Hormuz has already pushed up domestic energy prices; if the Bab el-Mandeb is also cut off, Pakistan will face a double squeeze of supply and price.

The Mediator's Dilemma

Since the outbreak of the US–Iran war, Pakistan's diplomatic role has passed through three stages. The first was messenger — carrying messages and proposals between Tehran and Washington. The second was mediator — pushing the two sides to exchange draft texts and forging a ceasefire mechanism. Now, with the conflict spilling onto the Saudi–Houthi front, Pakistan finds itself entering a third stage: the pressure of being dragged into choosing a side by its defense obligations.

Pakistan's dilemma lies in the layering of three contradictions. First, its defense pact with Saudi Arabia is not a matter of choice — it is a legal obligation, and the cost of exiting or letting it cool is extremely high. Second, Pakistan has long maintained a posture of neutral mediator on the Iran question; that credibility is a diplomatic asset not to be lightly surrendered. Third, the domestic energy and economic situation cannot withstand another battlefield — the public is already bearing the higher oil prices and cost-of-living pressures brought by the US–Iran war.

An often-overlooked dimension is that Pakistan's identity as a "mediator" carries a structural contradiction of its own. As a nuclear-armed state, a major member of the Islamic world, and a country that maintains close ties with both China and the United States, Pakistan's value lies precisely in its ability to talk to all sides. But once the parties in dialogue begin fighting each other directly, the stability of that position collapses sharply.

The Risk of a Double Chokepoint Blockage

A simultaneous blockage of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb would be a rare scenario in the modern history of global energy. Together the two straits carry roughly one-third of the world's seaborne oil trade. If both were disrupted at once, the alternatives would be extremely limited.

The Suez Canal Authority has sharply raised surcharges since July 15 — the surcharge for crude and product tankers climbing from 25% to 37%. The route around the Cape of Good Hope, while safer, adds greatly to both time and cost. The Arctic route (the China–Europe Arctic Express) is being validated as an emerging alternative, but constrained by its seasonal window, it cannot yet operate reliably year-round.

This set of figures is enough to show the gravity of the situation: Yanbu's daily crude loading at more than four times last year's same-period level — indicating the alternative route is being pushed to its limit; the Suez surcharge raised to 37% — indicating the cost structure of the traditional route is being rewritten; and Pakistan's domestic energy supply already feeling the first wave of impact — indicating that the reach of the conflict's spillover extends well beyond the war zone itself.

What Next: From a "Single Incident" to Reignited War

For now, the Saudi–Houthi confrontation is still being treated as a "single incident," and all parties are still trying to keep it within that frame. But the ingredients for a chain reaction are real: the Houthi missiles have already been fired, Saudi retaliatory airstrikes could escalate at any moment, and the moment Iran's power grid is struck by US forces, the order to blockade the Bab el-Mandeb would take effect.

Pakistan's "red line" declaration has served as a deterrent in the short term — it has made Iran understand that attacking Saudi Arabia means going to war with Pakistan. But the sustainability of that deterrence depends on whether Pakistan can prove it has both the capability and the will to enforce it. On the strategic chessboard of South Asia and the Middle East, Islamabad is making a move from which it cannot retreat.