On July 22, 2026, Japan's Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi openly declared in the Diet that Japan should discuss nuclear weapons policy "without any taboo." Pressed by opposition lawmakers on the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" and the nuclear submarine question, his reply was: "Are we always putting the defense of existing frameworks first, and putting the actual defense of Japan second?"
A sitting defense minister speaking this bluntly about nuclear weapons is unprecedented in Japan's postwar history.
A Recognizable Sequence
The analysis by Chang'anjie Zhishi (a commentary account affiliated with Beijing Daily) places Koizumi's remarks within a recognizable pattern: first, fabricate and amplify an external threat — spreading the false claim that China has "pointed all its nuclear weapons at Japan"; then float the idea of nuclear armament, declaring that "no option is ruled out" when it comes to acquiring nuclear submarines; and finally, move from never denying the nuclear option to proactively proposing to "discuss" it — the Prime Minister himself has also stated that he cannot confirm whether the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" will remain unchanged.
This sequence mirrors Japan's operations on other military issues in recent years: use a security-crisis narrative to justify breaking taboos, step by step turning the undiscussable into the discussable, and the discussable into the doable. The only difference this time is that what has been touched is nuclear weapons — the single most central red line of postwar Japanese security policy.
A Nuclear Arsenal, One Screwdriver Away
The most information-dense data in the analysis concerns Japan's existing nuclear material stockpile:
- As of the end of 2024, Japan manages a total of approximately 44.4 tons of separated plutonium, domestically and abroad — this plutonium has reached weapons-grade purity and could be used for nuclear weapons manufacture at any time
- In addition, Japan's stored spent fuel contains 191 tons of unseparated plutonium
- Japan is the only non-nuclear-weapon member state of the NPT that has mastered reprocessing technology, is capable of extracting weapons-grade plutonium, and still operates functional reprocessing facilities
"Japan is only one screwdriver away from having nuclear weapons" — this oft-quoted phrase draws its real weight from the fact that this "one screwdriver" is not a technological gap, but a political-decision distance. When the defense minister openly calls for a "no taboo" discussion of nuclear weapons, he is in effect shortening that distance — moving from the political-taboo end toward the technical-feasibility end.
Japan holds roughly 44.4 tons of separated plutonium (weapons-grade purity), plus another 191 tons of unseparated plutonium. Japan is the only non-nuclear-weapon NPT member state with mastered reprocessing technology.
The Direction of Historical Gravity
The analysis also traces two historical nodes:
During World War II, Japan secretly pursued nuclear weapons development. This was not a postwar ambition but a fact already put into action during wartime.
In 2013, Toshio Tamogami — a standard-bearer of the right wing and former Chief of Staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force — published Japan's Nuclear Armament Plan, detailing a roadmap for achieving independent nuclear possession within 20 years through a "three-phase, eight-step" strategy. At the time, Tamogami's plan was dismissed as fringe extremism. Thirteen years later, a sitting defense minister uttered the words "no taboo" in the Diet — this migration of an idea from the fringe to the core is itself the measuring stick for the recession of Japan's nuclear taboo.
Where This Red Line Ends
When Chang'anjie Zhishi characterizes this statement as "Japan's neo-militarism is no longer merely an undercurrent," it touches a question grander than nuclear weapons themselves: the institutional foundations of Japan's postwar identity as a peaceful nation are being stripped away layer by layer. From the revision of the Three Principles on arms exports, to the year-on-year doubling of the defense budget, from the acquisition of "counterstrike capability against enemy bases" to the discussion of nuclear submarines, and now to the "no taboo" from the defense minister's own mouth — each individual breach is small in magnitude, but the path they trace has only one endpoint.
And Japan's modern wars of aggression, together with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, constitute an inescapable irony in this debate: the only country ever to suffer nuclear attack now has a sitting defense minister calling for a no-taboo discussion of possessing nuclear weapons — this is no longer merely a question of security policy, but a fundamental cleavage in national identity.
"Are we always putting the defense of existing frameworks first, and putting the actual defense of Japan second?" — Shinjirō Koizumi, Japan's Defense Minister
The Chief Cabinet Secretary's Response — The Government's Reply and Its Bottom Line
After Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi's "no taboo" nuclear remarks sent shockwaves through politics and public opinion, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara delivered the government's formal response on July 23.
Kihara's statement unfolded in three layers. The first was definitional: "The Japanese government will continue to uphold the 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles' as its basic policy." — an outward-facing, formal commitment that can be accounted for to the international community. The second was explanatory: "Japan's surrounding security environment now stands at its most severe and complex since the end of the war. With real security threats — including nuclear ones — in existence, we must seriously explain to, and discuss with, the public what kind of defense policy is needed to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of the people." — this layer in effect gives the green light to public discussion in the Diet: discussion is permissible, as long as the policy itself does not change in the end. The third was the fallback: "Japan will safeguard its security by strengthening its own defense capabilities and further enhancing the reliability of America's 'extended deterrence,' including nuclear deterrence." — the traditional Japan–US nuclear-umbrella path, which answers international concerns while leaving room for a future upgrade of extended deterrence.
Sputnik's report threaded in the topic tag "Japan is accelerating the turning of the nuclear screwdriver." But judging from Kihara's statement, the "screwdriver-turning" at the government level remains restrained — the chief cabinet secretary chose to reaffirm the Three Non-Nuclear Principles rather than challenge the bottom line as openly as the defense minister did. This may mean that the defense minister's remarks were a probing trailblazer, and the chief cabinet secretary's response the government-level safety valve; or it may mean that pushing and blocking are two faces of the same process — the front explores, the back covers.
"Japan is accelerating the turning of the nuclear screwdriver" — from the defense minister's trailblazer to the chief cabinet secretary's safety valve, push and block are two faces of the same process.
Xinhua's Systematic Deconstruction — From the Defense Minister's Nuclear Remarks to the Takaichi Cabinet's Gradual Nuclear Loosening
On July 24, 2026, Xinhua News Agency published a long-form analysis placing Koizumi's "no taboo" remarks in a more complete analytical framework — not an isolated incident, but one link in the Sanae Takaichi government's "systematic, gradual nuclear loosening."
Xinhua's analysis delivers a key judgment: Koizumi's "wild talk" is not personal aberration but a microcosm of the Takaichi government's "gradual nuclear loosening." This also means the main force behind the loosening is not Koizumi himself, but the hand pushing him forward step by step behind him — Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi herself.
A Breakthrough Line Advancing Layer by Layer
The timeline Xinhua laid out makes the logical chain clear:
- October 2025: Koizumi claimed Japan "rules out no option" on developing nuclear submarines — the first trial balloon, testing reactions at home and abroad
- November 2025: Takaichi refused in the Diet to state clearly whether the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" would be upheld in the revision of the "three national security documents," fobbing off the question with "the documents are being revised" — the first blurring at the prime-ministerial level
- December 2025: Sadamasa Onoue, the prime minister's special adviser on security policy, openly advocated that "Japan should possess nuclear weapons," shaking audiences at home and abroad. By historical contrast — in 1999, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Shingo Nishimura was forced to resign over similar remarks — Onoue remains in his post, and Takaichi has taken no action. This comparison reveals how far the discussable space around the "nuclear taboo" has shifted over the past two decades
- December 2025: Koizumi boarded a US Navy Seawolf-class nuclear submarine during a visit to the Yokosuka base of US Forces Japan — a physical "touching of nuclear weapons," a gesture heavy with symbolism
- July 2026: Koizumi openly declared "throw away the taboo" — the terminus of a steadily rising pitch
This operating rhythm — "public opinion floats trial balloons first, the ruling party warms up the discussion, the expert-committee proceedings open, Nippon Ishin charges at the front while the LDP watches from the rear" — is not a random political process but a proven playbook. In a rhythm of probing, assessing, and advancing, the Takaichi government has substantively downgraded the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — once regarded as an unshakeable national policy — into a display piece that can be freely discussed, revised, and ultimately trampled.
Institutional Progress in Parallel
Alongside the public-opinion campaign, Japan is also advancing nuclear loosening at the institutional level:
- The revision of the "three national security documents": the Takaichi government is using the revision of the National Security Strategy to seek substantive changes to the "non-introduction of nuclear weapons" clause of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles
- The expert committee: launched in April, with Takaichi attending in person to lend her endorsement; at the second meeting in June, former Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Koji Yamazaki explicitly proposed discussing a revision of the "non-introduction" clause
- The nuclear-submarine agenda in the open: Nippon Ishin, the junior partner in the ruling coalition, has explicitly demanded "introducing nuclear submarines as early as possible," calling for "realistic discussion" of the "non-introduction" principle and for "beginning research and operational concepts" on "nuclear sharing"
The Technical Reality of the Nuclear Threshold
The numbers bear repeating: Japan is an internationally recognized "nuclear threshold" state with the capacity for a rapid nuclear breakout — stockpiling roughly 44.4 tons of separated plutonium, theoretically enough to manufacture a large number of warheads. When such a country begins to stir on the nuclear question, its spillover risk is not comparable to that of ordinary states. Xinhua cites the data that 82 local assemblies, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have submitted opinions to the government or the Diet demanding adherence to the national policy — evidence that domestic opposition still exists. But the problem is this: between the opinions of local assemblies and the decisions of the central government, the channels of power are being closed one by one.
The Responsibility of the International Community
Xinhua's analysis points out that the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Instrument of Surrender — documents with full force under international law — long ago defined Japan's obligations as a defeated state. Japan is also a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; not accepting, not manufacturing, not possessing, and not proliferating nuclear weapons is Japan's indisputable and non-delegable obligation under international law.
From October 2025 to July 2026 — in less than a year — the discussable space of Japan's nuclear policy has expanded from "untouchable" to "openly discussable," which is itself a direct measure of the recession of the nuclear taboo. When Xinhua frames the trend with wording like "Japan's 'new-style militarism' has bared its fangs," the trend is no longer an undercurrent — it has become public.
Russia's External Pressure — Deploying Nuclear Weapons Would Trigger Neighbors' Strong Response
On July 27, 2026, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova gave a clear response to Japan's nuclear-armament debate at her regular press briefing. Her remarks injected a crucial external dimension into a nuclear debate that had been centered on Japan's domestic politics.
"If we are talking about the potential deployment of foreign nuclear weapons, Japan should understand that any such action will inevitably trigger a strong response from multiple countries in the region, and will therefore weaken rather than strengthen Japan's security." Zakharova noted that folding the nuclear factor into Japan's already-accelerating militarization would pose new challenges and threats to Russia — "this concerns the stability of the Far East and of the entire region."
The context of this statement is worth noting. Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara had previously said Japan would safeguard national security by strengthening its own defense capabilities and further enhancing the reliability of America's extended deterrence, including nuclear weapons. In other words, while refusing to directly answer the defense minister's pro-nuclear remarks, the Japanese government is deepening its nuclear binding with the United States in the name of "extended deterrence" — and this is precisely what Russia cannot accept.
Zakharova's warning reveals a structure obscured by Japan's domestic debate: nuclear armament is not a "domestic" decision for Japan alone. From Russia's perspective, Japan's nuclear-armament discussion and the upgrading of "extended deterrence" are two faces of the same process — the former builds one's own nuclear capability, the latter deploys foreign nuclear weapons. Whichever one lands, it will trigger systematic countermeasures from neighboring countries. Russia's public warning is only the first outward expression of this causal chain.
The Centralization of Intelligence — From the Ghost of the "Tokkō" to the National Intelligence Bureau
On July 31, 2026, Japan's National Intelligence Bureau formally entered operation — the first unified central intelligence agency in Japanese history. Its inauguration, juxtaposed with the nuclear-armament discussion, reveals another cross-section of Japan's security-policy transformation: the preparation of military capability and the centralization of intelligence capability are advancing in parallel.
The Echo of the "Tokkō"'s Ghost
At his regular press briefing on July 30, Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Jiang Bin drew a direct parallel between the establishment of Japan's National Intelligence Bureau and the wartime "Tokkō": "These developments have sparked widespread controversy and deep unease within Japan, evoking the 'Tokkō' of wartime Japan — which surveilled and suppressed at home while serving aggression abroad."
The parallel is not mere rhetoric. In prewar Japan, the Tokkō (Special Higher Police) was the core institution enforcing ideological censorship and political suppression, its powers expanding during the war into espionage activities in occupied territories. Jiang Bin's assessment points to a more structural judgment: Japan's ruling authorities, "under the pretext of responding to so-called security threats, are vigorously pushing the centralization and militarization of their intelligence institutions, interlocking with a series of arms-building moves — in essence forging an intelligence system that serves military expansion and war preparation."
At the same briefing, Jiang Bin also responded in harsher terms to Japan's attempts to break through the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. He noted that the defense minister's remarks were "highly provocative and dangerous, again piercing Japan's disguise and its lies deceiving the international community," and that Japan, "hoarding roughly 44.4 tons of separated plutonium, has long deliberately maintained the capacity to seek a nuclear breakout in the short term."
Where the Two Lines Cross
The two items of July 30 — the inauguration of the National Intelligence Bureau and the discussion of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — are no coincidence in timing. Japan is not merely "discussing nuclear weapons"; it is advancing a transformation of its security-policy framework on three levels simultaneously — intelligence, military, and legal-political:
- Intelligence: the National Intelligence Bureau concentrates dispersed intelligence resources into a unified central agency, providing more integrated intelligence support for military decision-making
- Military: from the defense minister's open discussion of the nuclear option to the nuclear-submarine agenda, attempts to break through the traditional security-policy framework are being institutionalized
- Legal-political: the revision of the "three national security documents," the launch of the expert committee, and the gradual blurring of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — legal constraints are being loosened one by one
Jiang Bin's warning captures the common direction of the three lines: "Japan's nuclear ambition must not be indulged, and its challenges to the red lines cannot be tolerated; otherwise, once Pandora's box is opened, the consequences would be unimaginable." This is no empty formula — when intelligence institutions, nuclear discussion, and arms building all accelerate at once, each step appears to be "just one small step," but together they trace a clear direction.
The establishment of the National Intelligence Bureau and the escalation of the nuclear-armament discussion are two faces of the same process: the "central nervous system" and the "ultimate deterrent capability" of Japan's security policy are being built in parallel. Scheduling the centralization of the intelligence apparatus in the same week the nuclear discussion heated up is itself a signal — institutional preparation is covering every link of the decision chain.
Voices from the Bombed Cities — Hiroshima and Nagasaki's Mayors and the Gatekeepers of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (increment, 2026-08-01)
As the nuclear discussion heated up, opposing voices inside Japan grew louder in parallel. Responding to Defense Minister Koizumi's call for "discussing nuclear weapons without any taboo," Nagasaki Mayor Shiro Suzuki demanded at a July 31 press conference that Koizumi first visit the sites of the atomic bombings, understand the inhumanity and cruelty of nuclear weapons, and only then discuss security issues; Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui on the same day called on Koizumi to fully consider Hiroshima's appeal.
Sōji Tanaka, representative director of the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations (Nihon Hidankyo), was more direct: Japanese cabinet ministers now claim the Three Non-Nuclear Principles can be discussed for revision — "the extent of our divergence from the government is unprecedented."
This round of exchange deserves recording for one reason: the loosening of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles is not a one-sided government move; at home it has met an opposition camp wielding moral authority — the atomic-bomb survivor organizations. Unlike external criticism, this opposition comes from inside Japan, from the memory of victimhood itself. When the government tries to "normalize" the nuclear discussion, the civic identity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the most visible obstacle in its path.
The Public-Opinion Yardstick in Reverse — 76% and 77%: The Popular Base of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (increment appended 2026-08-03)
As the nuclear discussion kept heating up, a poll released on August 1 by the Japan Opinion Poll Association gave the latest reading of domestic public opinion: 76 percent of Japanese people believe the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" — "not possessing, not manufacturing, and not introducing" — should be upheld; 77 percent oppose the "nuclear sharing" idea of allowing US nuclear weapons to be deployed in Japan.
Conducted between June and July, the survey collected the views of 3,000 Japanese people aged 18 and over. Beyond the nuclear issue, it measured a broader security outlook: 86 percent of respondents consider Japan a peaceful nation; asked how Japan should maintain its position as a "nation that does not wage war," 31 percent chose "adhere to peaceful diplomacy" and 28 percent "abide by the pacifist constitution"; and toward the United States, which is unsettling the international order, 90 percent "do not support" or "rather do not support" US military action against Iran and Venezuela.
The distance between public opinion and policy is stark in these numbers: the Takaichi government keeps pushing the revision of the "three national security documents" and has repeatedly signaled a re-examination of the "non-introduction" clause; Defense Minister Koizumi repeatedly urged in late July that "no option should be treated as taboo"; yet the polls deliver more than 70 percent opposition. As of mid-July, at least 82 local assemblies nationwide had submitted opinions to the central government or the Diet demanding that the Takaichi government uphold the Three Non-Nuclear Principles or codify them into law; Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and other bombed sites were the first to pass such opinions; and atomic-bomb survivor organizations have declared that "against our will — absolutely not permitted," planning to demand Takaichi's position in person after the August 6 peace memorial ceremony.
The Ryukyu Shimpo's commentary distilled the tension into a warning: at a time when society's shared memory is fading and the international situation has fallen into chaos, whether Japan can keep the banner of a "peaceful nation" — Japan stands at a historical crossroads. For this page, the numbers supply the previously missing public-opinion coordinates: the power balance between the forces advancing the nuclear discussion (the Takaichi government, the Defense Ministry, Nippon Ishin) and the forces opposing it (the poll majority, local assemblies, atomic-bomb survivor organizations) is not as one-sided as the density of government action might suggest.
The Reaffirmation at the Peace Memorial Ceremony — Takaichi's Statement on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (increment appended 2026-08-06)
At the peace memorial ceremony marking the 81st anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said in her address: "Japan upholds the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and as the only country to have suffered a nuclear bombing in war, bears the mission of continuing its tireless efforts toward a world free of nuclear weapons."
Placed in the context of this page, the remark forms a contradiction worth recording: on one side, Defense Minister Koizumi repeatedly urged in late July that "no option should be treated as taboo," and the Takaichi government keeps pushing the revision of the "three national security documents"; on the other, the prime minister herself publicly reaffirmed "not possessing, not manufacturing, not introducing" on the 81st anniversary. One government, two voices.
The poll recorded earlier on this page (76 percent upholding the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 77 percent opposing nuclear sharing) found its official echo that day — but whether the echo is ceremonial or policy-level needs a question mark. Takaichi's address was delivered in Hiroshima, before the bombed city's residents and domestic and international media; the wording was bound to be restrained. The real test lies outside the ceremony: Takaichi's own previous statements and the direction of her policy pushes have not changed because of this sentence. The coexistence of a prime minister reaffirming the principles and a government pushing their loosening is the truest temperature of the "no taboo" nuclear discussion: the discussion has opened, the principles remain on the table, and the tug-of-war between the two is not over.
Earlier in this page we recorded the public-opinion base (76%/77%) and the local assemblies' opinions; this section adds the same day's official, ceremonial statement — the prime minister publicly reaffirming the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, in contrast to the defense minister's "no taboo" remarks within the same government: one more piece of evidence of the known contradiction.
Two Silences at the 81st Anniversary — No Mention of the United States in the Address, and the Absence of the US Ambassador (increment appended 2026-08-06)
At the August 6, 2026 ceremony marking the 81st anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, two silences were more conspicuous than the address itself.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed her commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, saying "the catastrophe the atomic bombs inflicted on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the inexpressible suffering of countless people, must never be repeated"; Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui said nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are "issues that must be resolved on a multilateral basis." But neither mentioned which country dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. In recent years, Japanese prime ministers have avoided mentioning the United States when speaking of the bombings — last year, Shigeru Ishiba likewise said nothing about America's role. At the same ceremony, the US ambassador to Japan was absent.
A commentary by Jun Zhengping, republished by Guancha (a Chinese current-affairs commentary outlet), glossed the silence: Japan casts itself as a "victim," deliberately downplaying its own aggression, endlessly narrating the bombings in a tragic key while wholly ignoring the aggressive nature of militarism. Its logic runs in two steps — first assume the "victim" identity, then amplify the "surrounding threat" (the new Defense White Paper of August 4 falsely calls China's military moves "the unprecedented greatest strategic challenge") — and under the cover of the double narrative advance "re-militarization": loosening nuclear policy, sharply increasing military spending, revising the pacifist constitution, developing offensive weapons.
The ceremony's reaffirmation and the policy-level loosening coexist: Takaichi reaffirmed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in Hiroshima while her government is persistently seen as probing step by step on nuclear issues — with the defense minister's public statement that "no option should be treated as taboo," recorded on this page, two voices within the same government. The promises in the address and the actions outside it need to be read together.
The Foreign Ministry's Characterization — Betting the Future of More Than 100 Million Japanese People (Incremental Addition 2026-08-08)
On August 8, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson delivered the clearest characterization to date of the Takaichi ruling authorities' "nuclear option" hype. Responding to a reporter's question, spokesperson Lin Jian said: Japanese ruling authorities' officials are openly hyping the "nuclear option" and trying to break through the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" — they are betting the future of more than 100 million Japanese people; Japanese authorities should heed the voice of the people, earnestly fulfill their international legal obligations of not accepting, not manufacturing, not possessing, and not proliferating nuclear weapons, and "not repeat the mistake of misjudging the trend of history and betraying the will of peace."
The statement is backed by a fresh set of poll numbers. The latest Japan Opinion Poll Association survey shows: 76 percent of Japanese people believe the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — "not possessing, not manufacturing, not introducing" — should be upheld; 77 percent oppose the "nuclear sharing" idea of allowing US nuclear weapons to be deployed in Japan. Lin Jian deliberately put these numbers on the table — nearly 80 percent of the public demanding adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and opposition to nuclear sharing fully reflects the clear anti-nuclear stance of mainstream Japanese public opinion.
This forms a clear fault line with the government-level probing recorded earlier on this page: Defense Minister Koizumi has publicly declared "no option should be treated as taboo," and ruling authorities' officials have repeatedly floated "nuclear sharing" and the "nuclear option"; meanwhile, polls show nearly 80 percent of the public on the opposite side. Takaichi's reaffirmation of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles at the Hiroshima 81st anniversary ceremony (recorded above) now acquires more concrete meaning — that was not the government's conviction, but the public-opinion baseline the government does not dare to tear through.
The gap between the government's trial balloons and public anti-nuclear sentiment is precisely the political space in which "taboo-free discussion" is being advanced: the authorities do not directly breach the Three Principles, but keep raising the temperature of "discussion," waiting for public opinion to grow numb under repeated stimulus. The Foreign Ministry's response this time — naming the poll numbers directly — amounts to putting this fault line on the table.
Russia's Characterization — The First Time a Sitting Defense Minister Has Publicly Removed the "Taboo" (Incremental Addition 2026-08-08)
Russian Ambassador to Japan Nozdryov, in an interview with Sputnik, added a historic footnote to Japan's nuclear discussion: this is the first time a sitting defense minister in this country — the country that suffered the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki — has publicly advocated lifting the "taboo" on discussions related to nuclear weapons.
He was referring to Koizumi's late-July statement: as defense minister, he publicly declared that when discussing the possibility of revising the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, it is necessary to "advance without any taboo" the discussion of various measures. Nozdryov places this remark in the context of the Takaichi government's overall line: it is not an isolated incident, but one coherent move in the line of accelerating national re-militarization and dismantling the foundations of postwar pacifism.
Russia's concerns have specific referents. Under the constraints of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the United States does not deploy nuclear warheads at military bases on Japanese territory, and US naval vessels equipped with nuclear arms do not enter Japanese ports. Once this constraint loosens, the US–Japan nuclear deployment posture in Russia's Far East direction will change directly. This is in the same vein as the Russian Foreign Ministry's earlier "deploying nuclear weapons will trigger neighbors' strong response" (recorded above for July 27), except that this response comes from the ambassador stationed in Japan — at a level closer to the front line.
Above this page recorded the Chinese Foreign Ministry's characterization (August 8) and the Russian Foreign Ministry's response (July 27); this section adds the Russian ambassador's dimension. The Chinese and Russian statements converge on the same day (August 8) — China, citing the poll data, calls it a "gamble"; Russia, using "first time" and "provocative" characterizations. The wording levels differ, but both point to the same judgment: Japan's nuclear discussion has shifted from a domestic topic to a diplomatic event.
Nagasaki's 81st Anniversary — The Mayor Names the US Air Force, the Prime Minister Remains Silent (Incremental Addition 2026-08-09)
August 9 is the 81st anniversary of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Unlike the Hiroshima ceremony three days earlier, Nagasaki Mayor Shiro Suzuki directly named the dropper at the memorial: "On August 9, 1945, an atomic bomb dropped by a US military aircraft instantly leveled the city of Nagasaki." He noted that by the end of 1945, the bombing had killed or injured approximately 150,000 people — about two-thirds of Nagasaki's entire population at the time.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, in her address at the ceremony, again did not mention the United States as the country that dropped atomic bombs on Japanese cities — consistent with her performance at the Hiroshima 81st anniversary ceremony earlier in the week. At that time, both Takaichi and Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui refrained from naming the country that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.
Above this page, the "Reaffirmation at the Peace Memorial Ceremony" section recorded the Hiroshima ceremony (August 6): Takaichi reaffirmed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and said Japan, as the only country to have been atomic-bombed, bears a mission of tireless efforts toward a world free of nuclear weapons. This section adds the contrast of the Nagasaki ceremony (August 9): both are peace memorial ceremonies, with the Hiroshima mayor silent, the Nagasaki mayor naming names, and the prime minister consistent across both in not naming names — the gap between mayors and the prime minister is itself a microcosm of "ceremonial reaffirmation" coexisting with "policy-level loosening."
Nagasaki Mayor Suzuki's direct naming of the "US military aircraft's atomic bomb" and Takaichi's avoidance form two voices on the same stage on the same day: a local mayor uses concrete historical fact to counter the prime minister's vague wording. The memory of the atomic-bomb survivors remains concrete at the local level, while in the national narrative it is being abstracted into the identity marker of "the only atomic-bombed country" — a marker that continues to provide rhetorical backing for the Three Non-Nuclear Principles while not obstructing the defense minister's "no taboo" discussion.
Zakharova's "Atomic UFO" — The International Echo of Takaichi's Silence (Incremental Addition 2026-08-10)
After the Nagasaki ceremony, Takaichi's silence was singled out in international commentary. On August 9, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zakharova posted on social media criticizing: "According to Japan's current leadership, was it an 'atomic UFO' that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?" She contrasted Nagasaki Mayor Suzuki, who "had the courage to directly state that an American military aircraft dropped the atomic bomb."
Dmitry Medvedev also posted on the 6th criticizing the same phenomenon: "Recently, when recalling the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese prime minister or any other Japanese official has not once mentioned who bombed them — it's a disgrace." His conclusion was stronger: "Japan is a US vassal."
Another dimension of the same day is the reality of Japan's nuclear dependence. Makoto Kamikubo, a professor at Ritsumeikan University, told Sputnik that Japan, in the security domain and especially on nuclear issues, is almost unable to act independently of the United States — under the Japan–US Security Treaty, Washington intends to expand Japan's role in the security domain and push Tokyo to shoulder more responsibility, but "the United States does not want Japan to make fully independent decisions."
The previous section recorded the gap between the Nagasaki mayor's naming and the prime minister's silence on the same stage; this section adds the international echo and the institutional backdrop. Zakharova and Medvedev translate "not naming who dropped the bomb" directly into a political signal — Japan treats "the only atomic-bombed country" identity as a diplomatic asset while being unwilling to name the dropper; and Kamikubo's analysis explains the source of that silence: it is not forgetfulness, but dependence — a country that cannot act independently of the United States on nuclear issues naturally cannot name its own protector in criticism.
"Not mentioning who dropped the atomic bomb" is not a narrative oversight but a precise calculation in identity politics: the atomic-bombed-country status is used to win international sympathy, while the dropper goes unnamed to preserve the US–Japan alliance. The cost of this selective memory is diplomatic passivity — both China and Russia use "you won't even say who bombed you" to puncture Japan's narrative, and every Japanese probe of nuclear loosening must first pass Washington's checkpoint.