Core argument: In June 2026, the "National Intelligence Council" establishment bill, championed by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's administration, passed through Japan's upper house of the Diet. This is not a routine organizational optimization — it creates a centralized intelligence system with absolute direction from the Prime Minister's Office, breaking down departmental barriers while deliberately blurring the legal boundaries of intelligence collection, the red lines protecting citizens' personal information, and the accountability provisions for unauthorized surveillance. The entire framework lacks parliamentary review and third-party oversight. Placing this legislation in the historical arc of Japan's postwar intelligence apparatus and its expansion — from the Tokkō (Special Higher Police) to contemporary intelligence reforms — it points not toward a "routine adjustment for a complex security environment," but rather toward a critical step in tightening social control and loosening the postwar security baseline.
I. What the Bill Does: Prime Ministerial Centralization and a Regulatory Vacuum
The core of the "National Intelligence Council" bill is the construction of a centralized intelligence system under the absolute direction of the Prime Minister's Office. It would break down intelligence barriers between departments, consolidate intelligence resources across the board, and substantially increase the operational authority of intelligence agencies.
But the bill deliberately blurs the boundaries of power — the permissible scope of intelligence collection is not clearly defined, the red lines protecting citizens' personal information have not been drawn, and binding accountability provisions for unauthorized surveillance are entirely absent. The entire system operates without parliamentary review mechanisms and without third-party oversight — creating an unprecedented regulatory vacuum of intelligence power.
This means that vast quantities of sensitive resources — Japan's government data, citizens' personal movement records, Self-Defense Force classified information — could be accessed and cross-departmentally repurposed at the discretion of intelligence agencies. Chang'anjie Zhishi (a commentary account affiliated with Beijing Daily) described this as "unbounded intelligence centralization," and concerns within Japanese society about a revival of "police-state surveillance" have been rising accordingly.
Scope of permissible intelligence collection not clearly defined
No red-line protections for citizens' personal information
No binding accountability for unauthorized surveillance
No parliamentary review or third-party oversight mechanisms
II. Historical Parallels: Intelligence Strengthening and Aggressive Adventurism
This is not the first time Japan has strengthened intelligence centralization. Viewed through the historical lens, the enhancement of Japan's intelligence capacity has often accompanied its foreign aggression and military adventurism. "Intelligence clears the path; espionage infiltrates" has been a recurring tactic in Japan's external expansion.
From the First Sino-Japanese War to the Second World War, Japanese intelligence agencies served as the vanguard in successive premeditated military campaigns — charging ahead to provoke conflict and invade other nations. During the Second World War, the infamous Tokkō (Special Higher Police) relied on this centralized intelligence system to impose repressive control: monitoring citizens, suppressing anti-war forces, purging dissenting voices, and conscripting the entire society into the service of militarist expansion.
Chang'anjie Zhishi's full analysis aligns this historical parallel directly with the current legislative context — Japan, ignoring historical lessons, is weakening intelligence oversight, loosening surveillance powers, and tightening social controls. Domestic Japanese media have characterized it as "a disguised return to the old methods of control," providing the institutional tools for right-wing forces to suppress peace advocates and silence opposition.
III. The Institutional Puzzle: From Intelligence Centralization to a Full-Spectrum War-Preparedness System
This bill is not an isolated institutional adjustment but a crucial piece of Japan's broader reconstruction of its national security apparatus. According to the government's full roadmap:
- July 2026: The new intelligence system formally launches
- Subsequent legislation: Introducing an "Anti-Espionage Law" and a "Foreign Agents Registration Act"
- New agency: Establishing a dedicated external intelligence agency
This sketches a comprehensive, seamless intelligence-control network. Under such a framework, anti-war demonstrations, legitimate public criticism of state power, and cross-border civil exchanges could all be arbitrarily labeled as "security risks."
On the day the bill passed, a steady stream of protesters gathered in front of the National Diet Building in Tokyo — citizens turning out to voice their opposition, underscoring how this security reform was advancing against the current of public sentiment.
IV. The Broader Picture: Sanae Takaichi's Full "Re-Militarization" Panorama
Placing the intelligence-centralization bill within the full arc of the Takaichi administration's trajectory since taking office, it emerges as one element in a sequence of actions:
- Deploying missiles with "strike capability against enemy bases"
- Dispatching large-scale combat personnel to joint military exercises
- Approving cabinet resolutions authorizing the export of lethal weapons
- Passing the "National Intelligence Council" bill, granting intelligence agencies unchecked powers
These actions have long since pierced any credible claim that Japan remains a "peaceful nation" committed to "exclusively defense-oriented" principles. Chang'anjie Zhishi's analysis places this entire sequence within the framework of "accelerating Japan's transformation into an East Asian source of instability" — the intelligence system is being skewed toward external expansion, moving further and further from the path of peaceful development.
V. CCTV-4's Framing — "Japan Wants to Build Its Own CIA": Multi-Expert Analysis
On June 13, CCTV-4 aired a special feature titled "Japan Wants to Build Its Own CIA," inviting three scholars from different disciplines to interpret the strategic significance of Japan's National Intelligence Council bill from different angles. This represents the most recent systematic framing of Japan's intelligence expansion by Chinese state media.
Liu Jiangyong (Tsinghua University): The Tradition of Centralized Intelligence
Liu Jiangyong approaches from the depth of Japanese political history, arguing that the fundamental purpose of Takaichi's intelligence-centralization push is to "strengthen control over domestic and foreign intelligence and reinforce centralized unified control." He directly links the "National Intelligence Council" bill to the post-Meiji Restoration tradition of intelligence expansion, placing it within a continuous historical lineage.
Lu Hao (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences): America's Strategic Acquiescence
Lu Hao's analysis takes the American perspective, arguing that the structural driver of Japan's intelligence centralization is precisely the United States: "After the Cold War ended, the United States increasingly wanted Japan to play a strategic frontier and strategic containment role in the Asia-Pacific region." Within this framework, the US attitude toward Japan's intelligence capabilities has undergone a transformation from "restrict and dismantle" to "support and integrate."
Xu Yongzhi (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations): Drawing Combat Experience
Xu Yongzhi's analysis is the most concrete, pointing to a specific operational piece of evidence: Japan dispatched four Self-Defense Force personnel to the Security Assistance and Training Command for Ukraine, attempting to "gain real-world combat experience from the Russia-Ukraine conflict." He assesses that Japan "is preparing for a long-term, high-intensity war."
| Expert | Angle | Core Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Liu Jiangyong | Historical lineage | Continuation of post-Meiji intelligence-centralization tradition |
| Lu Hao | External driver | US shift from restriction to tacit strategic acquiescence |
| Xu Yongzhi | Field evidence | Personnel dispatched to Ukraine to gain combat experience |
This three-dimensional framework — "history → external driver → operational evidence" — complements and substantiates the two dimensions of "historical parallels" and "re-militarization panorama" already present in earlier analyses.
VI. Opening in Three Months — The West Is Helping Japan Build a Central Intelligence Agency
On July 13, The New York Times published a report, confirmed by multiple sources, that Japan is establishing its first central intelligence agency since World War II and has been seeking help from Western partners. This is not a continuation of the earlier "National Intelligence Council" bill — it is a new, independent agency with its own budget (approximately US$407 million), its own staffing (several hundred employees initially), and its own launch timetable (expected to be operational by December). Takaichi herself is driving the project, and her team has privately contacted partner nations including the United States, Australia, and Germany in recent months for advice on technology, personnel arrangements, and priorities.
Australia's Ambassador to Japan, Andrew Shearer — who served as Australia's National Intelligence Director for four years — put it bluntly: Japanese officials believe the country's intelligence capacity "has been stagnant for decades." This assessment points to an objective dilemma — Japan's intelligence system has long been deeply fragmented: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Police Agency each collect and analyze intelligence independently, with no cross-departmental sharing mechanism. The country employs approximately 33,000 people in intelligence-related work, but has no central hub capable of assembling the fragments into a complete picture. The new agency's design objective is to end this fragmentation — to centralize intelligence collection and analysis under the Prime Minister.
Seen within the institutional puzzle of the past several months, this news follows a coherent logic: first, the "National Intelligence Council" bill lays the legal framework; then, a consistent media-opinion foundation is built through multiple channels — from CCTV-4's three experts to consistent coverage; and now the agency itself is being materialized. Takaichi's roadmap is clear — she builds the framework with legislation, shapes public opinion through the media, and fills technical gaps with foreign assistance, pushing all three layers forward simultaneously. Advisors from the United States and Australia are helping design technical systems and cross-departmental coordination documents; the head of Germany's BND recently visited Tokyo for dedicated discussions on intelligence-sharing.
But this roadmap contains an internal contradiction she cannot resolve. The domestic system she drives centralizes all intelligence power in the Prime Minister's Office — a system that requires a powerful central agency to operate; and the agency she seeks foreign help to build is precisely that same central institution. A nation's indigenous intelligence capacity being hand-built by foreign intelligence agencies is historically uncommon — it testifies both to how late Japan's start is (building from scratch) and to the likelihood that the new agency will be embedded with the asymmetries inherent in intelligence partnerships from its inception.
Opposition Diet member Mizuho Fukushima's objection stands at the other end of the spectrum: Japan has operated for eighty years without an independent intelligence agency, and that choice is "rooted in Japan's commitment to being a peace-loving country that has abandoned war." Her logic points to the most vulnerable link in Takaichi's roadmap — the gap between rapidly centralized intelligence power and weak oversight mechanisms. The new agency's oversight framework has not been defined, and the "National Intelligence Council" bill similarly lacks parliamentary review and third-party supervision. With two institutions stacked together, the "centralization" of the intelligence system is now exceeding what the "compliance" framework can cover.
Japan has operated for eighty years without an independent intelligence agency, and that choice is rooted in Japan's commitment to being a peace-loving country that has abandoned war.
VII. From "Spy Haven" to Counterintelligence Vacuum — Al Jazeera on the Historical Ruptures and Institutional Puzzle of Japan's Intelligence System
In the early hours of July 14, Consular Gossip shared Al Jazeera's in-depth reporting on Japan's newly created central intelligence agency. Its information overlapped substantially with The New York Times report of the day before, but the difference in angle allowed it to add several dimensions that had not previously been adequately discussed.
Two bodies, not one. Al Jazeera's report first cleared up a structural confusion — the legislation establishes not a single agency but two entities: a National Intelligence Committee serving as the command center for government intelligence collection and analysis, and a National Intelligence Agency (NRA) responsible for operations. The former sets direction; the latter executes. This dual structure relates to the earlier "National Intelligence Council" bill in one key respect: the new agency is not being built from scratch but is a reorganization and strengthening of the existing Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO). Ken Kotani, a professor at Nihon University, described it as "a model unique to Japan" — not a replica of the American CIA, but a centralized design tailored to the characteristics of Japan's administrative system.
"Spy haven" — the historical vacuum of counterintelligence capacity. The most forceful judgment in Al Jazeera's report rests on the statement of a historical fact: Japan currently has no counterespionage law. Foreign intelligence activities in Japan can therefore escape punishment relatively easily. The report cited the accounts of former Russian intelligence officers Stanislav Levchenko and Konstantin Preobrazhensky, both of whom had operated in Japan — they called the country "a spy haven." During the Cold War, Soviet intelligence services targeted Japan's technology, industrial, and commercial information as well as U.S. military bases on Japanese soil. Sanshiro Hosaka (a researcher at the International Defense and Security Center) offered a more systematic supplement: Japan needs a "foreign influence transparency act" to raise the transparency of lobbying, and a counterespionage law to authorize covert investigations.
This "counterintelligence vacuum" judgment shifts the focus of earlier analysis from "what Japan is now building" to "what Japan has been missing." For decades Japan has relied on American intelligence protection and lacked an independent domestic counterintelligence capacity — meaning that before expanding outward, the new agency must first fill a defensive gap that has long been neglected. And the reason this gap has persisted is not technical but institutional: Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits Japan from possessing an independent external intelligence agency.
The failure logic of the old system. Ken Kotani's diagnosis of the current system is sharper than The New York Times report of the day before: Japan's dispersed intelligence arrangement suffers from one core obstacle — no one has the authority to compel other agencies to cooperate, and no one has the authority to stop intelligence data from bleeding away. When the central intelligence agency was established in 1952, it was "not granted any legal authority over intelligence," and its political power has remained weak ever since. In addition, under current law it is difficult to intercept foreign representatives suspected of intelligence activities because "the legal basis is thin."
This diagnosis exposes an overlooked contradiction: Japan passed the "National Intelligence Council" bill a year ago, but that system was designed as a "council" — everyone sits down and talks — not as an "agency" — where someone decides and executes. The leap from council to agency is a fundamental shift from consensus-based decision-making to command-based execution, and in Japan's administrative culture such a transformation requires a far longer period of adjustment.
The base of public opinion — a silent majority rather than a supportive majority. Al Jazeera's report supplied a data point that had been missing until now: an April Jiji Press poll found that only 19 percent opposed the new legislation, roughly 40 percent remained neutral, and the rest expressed support. The report presented this as "the voice of opposition is not loud," but seen from another angle — only 41 percent clearly support it, meaning most Japanese citizens feel "no opposition but no enthusiasm" toward the new intelligence system. Combined with the street anti-war protests mentioned in May reporting, a more three-dimensional picture comes into focus: public opinion is not uniformly supportive or opposed but stratified — those who care protest, those who don't acquiesce by default, and active supporters amount to roughly 40 percent. Ken Kotani's remark — "the younger generation is not interested in such an old story" — adds a generational dimension: the fading memory of World War II is lowering society's sensitivity to the expansion of intelligence power.
VIII. From "Seeking Foreign Help" to "Building Its Own Hub" — The Supplementary Dimension of Global Times Reporting on July 16
On July 16, Chang'anjie Zhishi, citing Global Times, reported the latest progress in Japan's preparation of its central intelligence agency. The core information overlaps with what the preceding sections covered, but it supplies an analytical dimension that had not previously been fully developed — direct assessments from Chinese scholars.
In an interview with Global Times, Lü Chao, dean of the Institute of American and East Asian Studies at Liaoning University, placed Japan's new intelligence agency within a broader geopolitical structure: U.S. intelligence cooperation with Japan ultimately serves America's overall strategy of tightening its grip on the Asia-Pacific, while Germany's participation is effectively an act of coordination with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, paving the way for NATO's further outward expansion. The value of this judgment is that it points to the power-projection logic within "the West helping Japan build an intelligence agency" that had been diluted by the technical discussion in Japanese and American media — the "globalized" coordination framework among intelligence agencies also functions as a vehicle for NATO's extension from Europe into the Asia-Pacific.
Another of Lü Chao's judgments carries a sharper warning: the revival of militarism inside Japan is an objective trend and will, over the long term, sow hidden dangers for global security. This comment points to the historical parallel that the preceding sections already developed at length — the companionship between intelligence centralization and external adventurism — but it advances that parallel from "historical analysis" to "present-day assessment." When the speed at which intelligence power concentrates (a mere few months from the bill's passage to the agency's operation) far outpaces the construction of oversight mechanisms, the abstract notion of "militarism's revival" acquires a concrete institutional carrier.
IX. The NRA Formally Opens — On July 31, Japan's First Central Intelligence Agency Gets Under Way
On July 31, 2026, Japan's National Intelligence Agency (NRA) formally began operations. Its first director is Kazuya Hara, 59, the sitting head of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. On the same day, the National Intelligence Council, chaired by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, held its inaugural meeting; nine core cabinet ministers — including the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, finance, and justice — will use this body to make principled decisions on intelligence and counterintelligence.
Built on the foundation of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office and staffed by 730 personnel, the NRA is the first unified central intelligence agency in Japanese history. The decision to establish the agency and the National Intelligence Committee was approved by the Diet in May 2026.
From the legislative passage of the "National Intelligence Council" bill to the NRA's substantive operation, less than three months elapsed — a span that reflects the speed and resolve with which the Takaichi administration is pushing intelligence-system reform. A staffing scale of 730, direct centralized leadership by the Prime Minister's Office, and — for the first time — an intelligence decision-making council of core cabinet ministers: stacked together, these elements mark the formal entry of Japan's intelligence system's shift from dispersion to centralization into its operational phase.
X. The Symbolic Politics of "731" — The National Intelligence Agency Collides with a Historical Taboo
The NRA's launch date itself became a talking point: on July 31 — "7/31" — the Japanese government formally established the National Intelligence Agency. For the Chinese, "731" is no ordinary set of digits: it is the designation of Unit 731 of the Japanese invasion army, a symbol of human experimentation and war crimes. Japanese public opinion and commentators quickly folded the two facts together.
A Beijing Daily commentary republished the same day by Chang'anjie Zhishi read the event along a longer thread: in 2013, Abe posed for a photograph seated inside a "731" training jet; now the Takaichi government has scheduled the founding of its new intelligence hub on "731"; right-wing politicians keep instrumentalizing numbers that carry the memory of war. The article summarized this playbook in four steps — conceptual rewriting, institutional expansion of power, historical whitewashing, and symbolic probing — and pointed to its aim: "to make informational preparations for possible military intervention."
Intelligence first is the standard playbook for Japan's wars of aggression. In its invasion of China, the Japanese military relied on a fully developed intelligence network to complete its comprehensive infiltration of Northeast and North China... Today Japan is rebuilding a concentrated, high-efficiency intelligence machine and advancing it in lockstep with revisions to the Peace Constitution, increases in military spending, the development of long-range strike capabilities, the loosening of weapons exports, and attempts to abandon the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles." Its aim is unmistakable: to make informational preparations for possible military intervention.
Guanzhewang (Guancha.cn) likewise pointed to the symbolism of the date in its reporting: on the day the National Intelligence Agency was established, the National Intelligence Council — chaired by Sanae Takaichi and composed of nine cabinet ministers — held its inaugural meeting. What Japanese public opinion worries about more broadly is a different matter: the absence of effective oversight mechanisms for the government's intelligence-collection activities.
The commentary also called attention to an institutional backdrop: this year marks the 80th anniversary of the opening of the Tokyo Trial, yet the principal culprits of Unit 731 escaped prosecution for historical reasons. The absence of justice and the blank pages of history have allowed Japan's right wing to keep exploiting the loopholes — steadily whitewashing crimes, dissolving guilt, and reshaping a self-serving historical narrative. This "institutional vacuum" perspective mirrors the rupture recorded earlier on this page in Japan's intelligence system — "no counterespionage law, no independent oversight" (Section VII): the gap in historical accountability and the gap in present-day institutional oversight exist simultaneously at the two ends of the same machine.