On July 17, 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron held a joint press conference near Cologne, announcing that France and Germany would draw up a joint roadmap to "meet the challenges posed by Beijing." Macron elevated the problem Europe faces to the level of an "existential threat" — the sharpest rhetorical escalation yet in Franco-German statements on China. Yet behind the temporary shelving of Franco-German differences lie two structural counterweights: a profound divergence of interests within the EU, and China's grip on critical mineral supplies.
The Signal from Cologne
On July 17, German Chancellor Merz and President Macron held a joint press conference near Cologne, announcing that France and Germany would develop a joint roadmap to "meet the challenges posed by Beijing." The rhetorical register of this conference far exceeded that of any previous Franco-German statement on China.
Merz played down the trade deficit, saying it "must be addressed," while still signaling that he did not want a new conflict with Beijing. Macron, by contrast, struck a far harder tone: he warned that Europe was facing "an aggressive trade war" from China, and declared that France and Germany had "never been so aligned on the China question."
Germany's Turn
Germany's role in this shift is the most worth watching. For a long time, Berlin has been the main brake on the EU's hard line toward China: its automakers have defended their interests in the Chinese market, its small and medium-sized enterprises depend on China, and the entire German economic model rests on the complementarity between China's low-cost base and Europe's premium markets.
But the change in Merz's posture points to one thing: that defensive line is loosening. German companies are increasingly feeling the direct pressure of China's formidable export industries — not competition at the level of governments, but the erosion of market share as Chinese firms such as BYD and CATL capture territory across the European market.
Berlin's China policy has never been drawn along ideological lines; it reads only the ledger of interests. Once that ledger starts running red, a turn in political rhetoric is only a matter of time.
Amplifying the "Existential Threat" Narrative
Macron chose far more intense language than Merz. He characterized China's trade practices as "aggressive" and elevated the problem Europe faces to the level of an "existential threat."
This phrasing was not offhand. Earlier this year, the European Council had already used a similar characterization internally — the EU considers China's dominant economic strength to constitute an "existential threat." For Macron to deploy the term publicly at a press conference means that a judgment once circulated only in narrow circles is becoming the open language of Europe's official narrative.
Xin Hua, director of the Center for EU Studies at Shanghai International Studies University, notes that the consistent tenor of Germany's external strategy is to "extract benefits from every extra-regional great power"; its China policy of "hedging on all sides and swaying between the two" will not change. But should internal and external pressures breach a tipping point, a sudden shift cannot be ruled out.
The Roadmap's Timeline
The Franco-German joint roadmap is to be unveiled before a summit of European leaders in October this year, drafted jointly by the two countries' finance ministers and foreign ministers. This means the next three months will be a critical window for China–EU trade relations.
The specific content of the roadmap has not yet been disclosed, but several points are worth watching:
- Trade deficit — the EU is studying how to shrink a trade deficit with China that exceeds €360 billion (roughly $412 billion)
- Industrial competition — the EU is trying to find ways for domestic industries to compete with "state-subsidy-dependent Chinese firms"
- Franco-German coordination — the joint roadmap itself means Franco-German differences have been temporarily shelved; this is the policy substance behind Macron's claim that the two have "never been so aligned"
Professor Xin, however, also sees the other side. He points out that China "firmly controls the supply of minerals and chips that are vital to Europe's key industries — defense, automobiles and others" — which complicates any hard measures the EU might take against Beijing, since China can use export controls to put European firms in a bind.
The Other Side of the Coin
The narrative escalation of a Franco-German joint front on China does not fully amount to a comprehensive turn in policy execution.
Within the EU there is a profound divergence of interests. Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece) place more weight on the tangible gains from Chinese investment; Eastern European countries (Hungary, Serbia) view China as a source of infrastructure financing and industrial transfer; the Nordic countries waver between values and trade interests. The Franco-German axis can shape the direction of EU policy, but it cannot make decisions for all member states.
Moreover, China's command over Europe's supply of critical minerals — rare earths, lithium, gallium, germanium — means that before taking any extreme measure, Europe must weigh the cost of retaliation. This explains why, even as Macron struck a hard tone, he also called for dialogue with Beijing on issues such as exchange rates and financial-market opening.
Where this ledger ultimately lands depends on the trade data of the next three months, the intensity of lobbying from German industry, and whether the Merz government can reach internal consensus amid coalition coordination. The roadmap is only a starting point, not a destination.